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Abstract
We study location choice and residential mobility responses to local income taxes
exploiting a special tax regime which applies to foreign employees residing in Switzer-
land. The institutional setting used generates a deterministic duration threshold at
5 years of stay in the country, at which the local tax rates an individual faces si-
multaneously change in all municipalities. We exploit this exogenous variation by
applying a fuzzy regression discontinuity design to merged survey and administrative
individual-level data. A dynamic location choice model allows us to derive testable
hypotheses of individuals’ location choices and mobility decisions. Our estimated
treatment effects provide causal evidence for tax-induced residential choices and tax
induced intra-national mobility.
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1 Introduction
Differences in the tax burden across local jurisdictions allow taxpayers to reduce their tax
liability by moving to low-tax locations. Such tax-induced mobility creates an additional
response margin and potentially leads to stronger reactions of the tax base in fiscally
decentralized countries compared to centralized countries. While the basic intuition of
a mobile tax base is apparent, there is still remarkably little robust evidence on the
importance and magnitude of the mobility margin of the tax base except for special
groups, such as soccer players, star scientists or high-income foreign workers. This paper
provides causal evidence of tax-induced mobility by exploiting a special foreigners’ income
tax regime in Switzerland.
The outcomes and effects of income tax reforms depend fundamentally on taxpayers’
responses. Individual responses affect the tax base and hence the resulting change in tax
revenue. Valid estimates of the elasticity of the tax base with respect to tax rates, as
well as the heterogeneous responses of different groups of taxpayers, are therefore key
in designing tax policy (see, e.g., Wilson, 1980; Feldstein, 1999, 1995; Mirelees, 1971).
For fiscally decentralized countries such as the United States, Canada, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, and Denmark, the mobility margin is particularly important because mobility
within the country is potentially related to the tax burden and could be obstructive to
the redistribution goals of a tax system (see, e.g., Mirelees, 1982; Epple and Romer,
1991; Feld, 2000; Feldstein and Wrobel, 1998; Fernandez and Rogerson, 1996; Hodler and
Schmidheiny, 2006; Roller and Schmidheiny, 2016).
The theoretical and empirical literature on behavioral reactions to taxation has almost
entirely focused on responses in taxable income (see, e.g., Chetty et al., 2011; Saez, 2010;
Chetty et al., 2013; Kleven and Waseem, 2013; Spencer and Selin, 2014) and labor supply
responses (Saez et al., 2012). More recently, other types of behavioral responses serving
to evade or avoid taxes have gained attention (Feldstein, 1999, 1995; Saez et al., 2012).
So, while there is ample evidence for reactions along some margins, the literature on
tax-induced mobility and location choices is more recent and the effects are less well
understood. This might partly be due to the inherent reverse causality between income
taxes and their tax base, which makes it difficult to causally identify tax-induced mobility
in empirical settings.
Many empirical studies in this field exploit panel variation in tax changes over time
or quasi-experimental variation to identify the causal impact of taxes on individual’s
location choices and mobility decisions (see Esteller et al., 2017, for a review). Recent
contributions concentrate on tax-induced mobility of special groups, such as soccer players,
star scientists or high-income foreign workers. Kleven et al. (2013) find a strong effect
of tax burdens on the international mobility of top earners in the European football
market. Kleven et al. (2014) evaluate the effect of a preferential tax regime for high-
income foreigners, using Danish administrative tax data, and find that a preferential tax
rate for foreigners substantially increased the inflow of high income individuals. Young
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and Varner (2011) study the effect of an introduced millionaire tax on the migration of the
affected population in New Jersey with a difference-in-differences approach. They report
that there is no substantial outflow that could be associated with this change. Akcigit
et al. (2016) use panel data on inventors and exploit changes in top tax rates to study the
mobility reactions of “superstar” inventors. Relatedly, Moretti and Wilson (2017) exploit
the variation in state personal and business taxes to investigate the migration patterns
of star scientists in the US. Both document that taxes seem to matter for migration
decisions. Finally, Agrawal and Foremny (2017) exploit the fact that a Spanish reform
led to income tax heterogeneity among regions. They find no effect of taxes on mobility;
however, they document an effect of taxes on location choices, conditional on moving.
We add to this empirical literature by studying how individuals’ location choices and
mobility decisions react to income taxes in a highly decentralized country. We exploit
a special institutional regulation in the Swiss tax law that affects foreign employees.
Ordinary income tax rates in Switzerland differ across the 26 cantons and the roughly
2500 municipalities. Foreigners whose yearly gross income is below 120,000 Swiss francs
(around 130,000 US-Dollars in 2015) are, however, subject to a special tax regime (Quel-
lenbesteuerung) until they get a permanent residence permit, for which they can apply
after five years of stay in Switzerland. For taxpayers in the special foreigners’ tax regime,
income tax rates do not differ across municipalities within a canton. The way the special
income tax rate is determined results in two types of municipalities: high-tax munic-
ipalities where the ordinary tax rate is higher than the special tax rate, and low-tax
municipalities where the ordinary tax rate is lower than the special tax rate. This institu-
tional arrangement produces a deterministic threshold at five years of stay, which leads to
a shift from the special into the ordinary tax regime, leading in turn to a sudden change
in the individual’s local tax rates. This threshold, and the resulting local randomization,
allows us to identify the causal effects of local income tax rates on individuals’ location
and mobility decisions, using a fuzzy regression discontinuity (RDD) design. Note that
our treatment is a pure change in the local tax burden, leaving potential confounding
factors such as local public goods provision, housing prices and all other municipality-
specific amenities unchanged. Also note that the exploited tax regime change happens
exactly once during an individual’s stay in Switzerland. The tax rate changes can there-
fore be seen as permanent from the perspective of the treated individual. Hence, our
estimates are not subject to the critique recently formulated by Hennessy and Strebulaev
(2015), which states that policy parameters estimated from dynamic policy environments
are plagued by biases, as economic actors in such settings form expectations that affect
their responses and potentially bias the estimated parameters.
To understand the treatment induced by the two tax regimes and to derive testable
hypothesis about its effect, we study a dynamic location choice model with moving costs.
Incentives change fundamentally for foreigners in the special tax regime around the dura-
tion threshold of 5 years. Foreigners living in a high-tax municipality face a rise in income
tax rates while foreigners in low-tax municipalities benefit from a drop in income tax rates.
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But the tax regime change simultaneously affects the local tax rates in all municipalities
in their choice set. This simultaneous change has to be taken into account when making
predictions about how individuals should react, as not only the change in their municipal-
ity of origin matters, but also all other related tax changes. The model predicts that the
effect of such a simultaneous tax rate change on the probability of choosing a particular
municipality is positive for the lowest-tax municipality and negative for the highest-tax
municipality. Our model also predicts that the effect on the probability of moving away
from a particular municipality is negative in municipalities with above average net-of-tax
rates and positive in municipalities with below average net-of-tax rates.
We document strong responses to local income taxes in high income earners’ residen-
tial and mobility decisions, while lower income groups seem to be unresponsive. High
income foreigners receiving the permanent residence permit at the 5 year threshold are
substantially and significantly less likely to choose one of the municipalities of the high-
est tax group and substantially and significantly more likely to move if they have been
residing in one of them, compared to their control group just below the threshold value.
This constitutes causal evidence for residential choice and mobility responses to income
taxation within a country. We find that these effects are strongest for households without
children, which arguably have lower moving costs. However, we do not find any significant
effect on the moving probability for individuals residing in one of the lowest-tax munici-
palities, experiencing a tax drop, which suggests an asymmetric response to tax increases
and tax decreases which is not in line with our theoretical predictions.
Our theoretical framework allows us to translate the identified fuzzy RDD estimate
into an estimate of the migration elasticity with respect to the net-of-tax rate. We estimate
migration elasticities that are considerably higher than the values found in the literature
so far. However, they are very imprecise and therefore not very informative beyond being
significantly positive.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a detailed descrip-
tion of the institutional setting and Section 3 presents a dynamic multinomial location
choice model. The empirical strategy applied is briefly described in Section 4. The data
is described in Section 5, the estimated treatment effects are presented in Section 6 and
discussed in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.
2 Institutional background
Switzerland is a natural laboratory for research on local taxation, due to the huge variation
in tax rates down to the municipal level. The Swiss Confederation consists of three orga-
nizational layers: the federal level at the top, the cantonal layer of 26 cantons, and around
2500 municipalities that make up the municipal layer. All three layers have considerable
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Figure 1: Average income tax rates in the canton of Zurich, for a single household without
children and a gross income of 100,000 Swiss francs in the year 2010.
2.1 Ordinary tax regime
The income tax liability for a person with a tax domicile in Switzerland is composed of
three parts:1 The federal income tax, the cantonal income tax and the municipal income
tax. The progressivity of tax rates is determined by the federal and the cantonal tax
schedules. The municipal tax rate is calculated as the cantonal tax rate times a tax
multiplier (Steuerfuss) set by the municipality. The total tax liability from all three parts
depends on household type and income class. Taxpayers file an annual tax declaration
with this information and pay their tax retrospectively. The described ordinary tax regime
results in substantial differences in income tax rates across Swiss municipalities. The left
map in Figure 1 shows the ordinary tax rates for a high-income individual in the canton of
Zurich as an example. As this figure demonstrates, income taxes, even within a canton,
exhibit a substantial variation. So, for example, a single individual with an income of
100,000 Swiss francs living in the city of Zurich in 2010 could reduce his tax burden from
about 13.71% to 11.48% by just moving to Zollikon. Consequently, he could reduces his
tax liability by about 2.23%, and thus about 2200 Swiss francs a year, by just moving
about 6 km and accepting a train ride of 10 min to Zurich.
1In some cantons a church tax is also added. Depending on the canton this can be mandatory or
voluntary.
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2.2 Special tax regime for foreigners
Besides the ordinary tax regime, there is a special tax regime (“Quellensteuer”) which
has been applied nationwide since 2001. Income tax payments in the special regime are
directly subtracted from the salary and collected by the employer (i.e. withheld at source).
As a result, all labor income of foreigners within this tax regime is third-party reported.
Household characteristics such as marital status and children, which affect deductibles,
are taken into account such that taxpayers in the special regime do not have to, and are
not meant to, file a tax declaration.
The special tax regime applies to incomes from employed foreign persons who have
their tax domicile in Switzerland, have not yet received the Swiss permanent residence
permit (type C), and are not married to a Swiss citizen or to a foreign person who holds a
permanent residential permit.2 Foreigners holding a temporary residence permit (type B)
can apply for a permanent residence status (permit C) after a five-year continuous stay
in Switzerland.3 All foreigners with yearly gross income above 120,000 Swiss francs are
subject to the ordinary tax regime.4
In the special tax regime, there is a canton-wide municipal and cantonal tax rate. This
canton-wide tax rate is calculated as a weighted average of the municipal rates within the
canton for a given income and household type. Foreigners subject to this special tax regime
therefore face no variation in income tax rates across municipalities within a canton. The
right map in Figure 1 shows the special tax rates for a high-income individual in the
canton of Zurich as an example. The average income tax rate for an unmarried foreign
worker without children and a gross income of about 100,000 Swiss francs amounts to
13.39 % in the special tax regime and between 11 and 14 % in the ordinary tax regime.
The local ordinary tax rate will be higher than the canton-wide special tax rate in some
municipalities and lower in others. We will refer to the former municipalities as high-tax
municipalities and the latter as low-tax municipalities.
Figure 2 visualizes the tax rate in both tax regimes for the highest tax and the lowest
tax municipality in 2010 in the canton of Zurich over the entire income distribution up to
120,000 Swiss francs. The tax rate in the at-source tax scheme lies somewhere in between
for the whole income range. The ranking of municipalities within cantons by tax rates is
the same across all incomes because the municipalities only set a constant tax multiplier.
2Foreigners who cross the border daily are also taxed at a special tax rate, but this is not of interest
in this study, thus an explanation will be omitted here.
3The five year limit applies to foreigners from Belgium, Germany, Denmark, France, Liechtenstein,
Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Spain, Finland, United Kingdom, Ireland, Iceland,
Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, USA, Canada, Andorra, Monaco, San Marino and Vatican City. For
foreigners from all other countries the normal limit is ten years, but they might be also allowed to apply
for a permanent residence permit after five years if they meet certain integration conditions. We restrict
our sample to origin countries for which the 5 year threshold applies and further exclude citizens of the
United States, as it taxes the worldwide income of its non-resident citizens. Incentives arising from the
two tax regimes are consequently very different for these individuals.
4In the canton of Geneva the limit is 500,000 Swiss francs. Geneva is therefore ignored in the empirical
analysis. We further ignore Basel-Stadt because at-source taxed persons can request to be compensated
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Figure 2: Combined federal, cantonal and municipal tax rate for a single household with no
children over the income range in the canton of Zurich in the year 2010.
The classification of municipalities into low-tax and high-tax entities does therefore not
depend on income.
2.3 Thresholds from the two tax regimes
The two tax regimes produce two thresholds: an income threshold and a duration thresh-
old. We will exploit the latter in this paper.5 The duration threshold occurs after five years
of stay in Switzerland, when an individual with an income below 120,000 Swiss francs is
eligible for permanent residence status (permit C). The permanent residence status leads
to a shift from special into ordinary taxation.6 Application for a permit C is a legal right
after five years of residence and in principle not an obligation. The duration threshold
therefore leads to a fuzzy regression discontinuity design (fuzzy RD or FRD) in which the
treatment (ordinary tax regime) can only be taken up if the assignment variable (duration
of stay) crosses the threshold (five years). The permanent residence status (permit C)
is very beneficial to workers: In contrast to permit B (the temporary residence permit),
permit C is unconditional, does not expire, does not depend on employment status or
whether a child or person in their charge depends on welfare. Holders of permit B have
to periodically ask their employers to apply for a renewal of the permit. This renewal is
not automatic and might be declined. Permit C basically equates foreigners with natives
5An earlier version of this paper (Schmidheiny and Slotwinski, 2015) documents that individuals
strategically adapt their income around the income threshold. However, in this study we concentrate on
the second threshold and exclude the potential impact of the income threshold by excluding the bunching
(or manipulation) income range (120k ± 6k) from our estimation sample. We briefly discuss this income
adaption in Section 7.
6The new tax regime is applied starting from the following month, and individuals have to file a tax
declaration at the end of the year, just as Swiss residents do.
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on the labor market. For example, foreigners holding the permanent residence permit
are allowed to start their own business, can stay abroad for 2 years without losing their
status and do not have to leave Switzerland when they become unemployed. Mobility and
living conditions within the country are, however, not affected by the residence status.
Many cantons automatically assign the permanent residence permit to foreigners as soon
as they are eligible, and individuals cannot legally refuse to accept it. These advantages
and regulations very likely prevent a strategic self selection into permit C status and thus
into the special tax regime for longer. The long-run proportion of those who hold permit
C is consequently very high. In our estimation sample, about 95 % of individuals residing
in Switzerland for longer than 10 years report holding the permanent residence permit.7
The duration threshold creates a quasi-experiment in which foreign employees who
crossed the threshold and applied for permit C form a treatment group that is exposed to
tax rates that differ across space, while foreign employees who have not yet crossed the
threshold form a control group that is exposed to a constant tax rate across space.
3 Theoretical considerations
This section studies a dynamic model of the choice between many municipalities to un-
derstand the treatment induced by the two tax regimes and to derive testable hypotheses
about its effect on residential and mobility decisions.
3.1 A dynamic location choice model
Consider a household i’s choice between M municipalities m = 1, ...,M in two time
periods t = 1, 2. Municipalities are characterized by the individual-specific municipal tax
rate τimt, the municipal-specific housing price level pmt, and other municipality-specific
amenities aimt which may be individual-specific.
Household i receives the utility Uimt when choosing municipality m in period t. The
household chooses the municipality m that yields the highest utility,
Uimt > Uist for all s 6= m. (1)
The chosen municipality of household i in period t is recorded in yit. In period t = 2, the
household’s utility is given by
Uim2 = Vim2 − c · 1[yi2 6= yi1] + εim2 (2)
where c > 0 is a moving cost and 1[yi2 6= yi1] is an indicator function that takes the value
1 if the household moves between periods 1 and 2 (see, e.g., Moretti and Wilson, 2017).
7Individuals shifting to ordinary taxation have to fill in an income tax declaration as do Swiss residents
in the following year and taxes are no longer withheld by their employer. We expect this change to be
quite salient, especially for those shifting due to the receipt of the permanent residence, as they have
been accustomed to source taxation for five years.
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The deterministic part Vimt = Vimt(Timt, pmt, aimt, xit) is a function of the municipal
net-of-tax rate Timt = log(1 − τimt), the local housing price pmt, other amenities aimt, as
well as individual characteristics in xit. We assume that utility Vimt strictly increases with
the net-of-tax rate Timt and that this effect is homogeneous across municipalities m:8
∂Vimt
∂Timt
= βi > 0. (3)
The idiosyncratic error term εimt captures taste shocks or family events. We assume
that εimt follows a type-1 extreme value distribution as in McFadden (1974) and that εimt
is independent across time periods.
The choice probabilities in period t = 2 are conditional on the municipality chosen
in period t = 1. The conditional probability that a household i in origin municipality m

















Note that the higher the moving costs c, the higher the probability of staying in the
same municipality. In the limit as c→∞, the probability of staying is one, Pim2|im1 → 1
and Pim2|is1 → 0 for all s 6= m. In the absence of moving costs, the choice probabilities







This is also the choice probability for a household that faces moving costs to all munici-
palities, for example, a household that newly arrives in the region.
3.2 Treatment
In our empirical strategy, we compare a control group that faces identical tax rates across
all municipalities, τ̃i2 (the special tax regime) with a treatment group that faces varying
municipal tax rates τim2 (the ordinary tax regime). Our treatment is a simultaneous
change of the local income tax rate in all municipalities m for individual i. The change
8 The deterministic part Vimt could, for example, be specified as
Vimt = α+ βlog(1− τimt)− γlog(pmt) + δlog(aimt) + θlog(xit),
where xit is a vector of household characteristics including income. Such a log-linear specification is
directly derived from a utility maximizing household with income xit and Cobb-Douglas utility over
housing, another private good and a local amenity (see, e.g., Schmidheiny, 2006).
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for an individual i in municipality m is ∆τim2 = τim2− τ̃i2. Without loss of generality, we
order the municipalities by this change
∆τi12 ≤ ∆τi22 ≤ ... ≤ ∆τiM2 (7)
where at least one of the inequalities is strict. Equivalently,
∆Ti12 ≥ ∆Ti22 ≥ ... ≥ ∆TiM2. (8)
Our institutional setting guarantees that this municipality order is the same for all house-
holds i. We therefore call municipalities with τim2 < τ̃i2 low-tax municipalities and mu-
nicipalities with τim2 ≥ τ̃i2 high-tax municipalities. The change in the net-of-tax rate
is accordingly positive for low-tax municipalities, ∆Tim2 > 0, and negative for high-tax
municipalities, ∆Tim2 ≤ 0.
Note that our treatment is a pure change in the net-of-tax rates Tim2, leaving the
municipality-specific housing price level pmt and all other municipality-specific amenities
aimt unchanged. This ceteris paribus nature of our treatment is the basis of our identifi-
cation strategy.
3.3 Effect on location choice
Our empirical strategy provides an estimate of the probability of an individual residing in
a particular municipality for both the treatment and the control group. In the theoretical





(Pim2|is1 · Pis1). (9)
Pim2 is a function of the M conditional probabilities Pim2|is1 of choosing municipality m
and of the M unconditional probabilities Pis1 of residing in municipality s in period 1.
The effect of our treatment on the marginal location choice probability is less straight-
forward than it may seem at first glance, because the treatment changes the tax rates si-
multaneously in all municipalities. Imagine, for example, a low-tax municipality in which
the income tax rate for foreign workers is lowered by the treatment. This municipality is
clearly more attractive under treatment than without treatment. However, this increase
in attractiveness does not necessarily lead to an increase in the choice probability because
other low-tax municipalities may have become even more attractive. Furthermore, the
unconditional choice probabilities in period 2 depend on the entire spatial distribution of
location choices in period 1 described by the unconditional choice probabilities in period 1.
We show in Appendix A.1 that the effect of a simultaneous change of all tax rates τim2
and hence all net-of-tax rate in logs, Tim2, on the probability of choosing municipality m











where dTim2 is the marginal change in individual i’s net-of-tax rate in municipality m,
dT i2|is1 =
∑M
k=1 Pik2|is1dTik2 is the average of all net-of-tax rate changes weighted by the
conditional choice probabilities of a household living in municipality of origin s. Equation
(10) implies the following testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 (Effect on location choice).
The effect of a simultaneous change of all tax rates on the probability of choosing a par-
ticular municipality is (a) strictly positive for the lowest-tax municipality, i.e. dPi12 > 0,
and (b) strictly negative for the highest-tax municipality, i.e. dPiM2 < 0.
Proof follows directly from equation (10) as shown in Appendix A.2.
We show in Appendix A.3 that Hypothesis 1 generalizes to groups of municipalities
ordered by tax rates. Hence, the treatment will increase the probability of choosing any
group of municipalities formed by the lowest-tax municipalities, while it will decrease the
probability of choosing any group of municipalities formed by the highest-tax municipal-
ities.
3.4 Effect on mobility
Our empirical strategy also provides an estimate of the probability of moving for house-
holds living in any given municipality. In the theoretical model, this is the probability of
moving from municipality m to any other municipality:










where Pim2|im1 is the probability of staying in municipalitym. Note that there is a positive
moving probability for any household due to shocks in the idiosyncratic error εimt even
if the characteristics of all locations remain constant. The moving probability falls with
moving costs c and converges towards 0 as moving costs c→∞.
We show in Appendix A.4 that the effect of a simultaneous change of all tax rates
τim2, and hence all net-of-tax rates (in logs), Tim2, is given by
dPmove|im1 = −βiPim2|im1
(
dTim2 − dT i2|im1
)
= −βiPim2|im1(1− Pim2|im1[1− e−c])(dTim2 − dT i2) (12)
where dTim2 is the marginal change in individual i’s net-of-tax rate in municipality m,
dT i2|im1 =
∑M
s=1 Ps2|im1dTis2 is the average of the net-of-tax changes weighted by the





is the average of the net-of-tax changes weighted by choice probabilities in the absence of
moving costs.
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Hypothesis 2 (Effect on moving).
The effect of a simultaneous change of all tax rates on the probability of moving away
from a particular municipality is (a) strictly negative in municipalities with net-of-tax
rates above average (low-tax), i.e. dPmove|m1 < 0 if dTm2 > dT 2, and (b) strictly
positive in municipalities with net-of-tax rates below average (high-tax), e.g. dPmove|m1 >
0 if dTm2 < dT 2.
Proof follows directly from equation (12) as shown in Appendix A.5.
We show in Appendix A.6 that Hypothesis 2 generalizes to groups of municipalities
ordered by tax rates. Hence, the effect of a simultaneous change of all tax rates on the
probability of moving conditional on staying in any municipality of a particular group is
strictly negative for groups where all municipalities have net-of-tax rates above average
(low-tax) and strictly positive for groups where all municipalities have net-of-tax rates
below average (high tax).
3.5 Migration elasticity
We define the migration elasticity as the percentage effect of a percentage change in
the local net-of-tax rate 1 − τim2 of an individual municipality m on the unconditional










where the derivation is shown in Appendix A.7. Note that the migration elasticity depends
on the entire spatial distribution of location choice probabilities Pis1 in period 1. In the
absence of moving costs, i.e. if and only if c = 0, the migration elasticity simplifies to the
common expression ηim = βi(1− Pim2).
4 Empirical strategy
As described in Section 2, workers from many European countries and Canada can ap-
ply for a permanent residence status (permit C) after 5 years of uninterrupted stay in
Switzerland.9 Foreign residents holding the temporary residence status (permit B), which
is granted for a maximum duration of 5 years, normally receive an official letter announc-
ing its upcoming expiration about 3 months before its termination. If they intend to stay
in Switzerland they need to file a form on the basis of which the cantonal migration office
then decides whether and which permit is granted. Some cantons automatically grant
permit C for eligible workers while other cantons only grant permit C after application.
Federal regulation stipulates that workers cannot choose their type of residence status
and that permit C cannot be renounced because of e.g. tax reasons.10




For foreigners with gross incomes below 120,000 Swiss francs, the permanent residence
status (permit C) leads to a switch from the special to the ordinary tax regime. Depending
on the municipality of residence, these individuals experience a tax increase or decrease
when granted permanent residence status (permit C). The 5-year threshold creates a
deterministic threshold of treatment eligibility that allows estimating the causal effect of
the change in the tax rate with a regression discontinuity design (RDD). The treatment
assignment is fuzzy because not all foreign workers immediately apply for permanent
residence status or are not immediately granted it. The duration threshold therefore only
determines eligibility for the treatment.
We study two outcome variables motivated by Hypotheses 1 and 2: the probability
of residing in a particular municipality and the probability of moving conditional on
previously living in a particular municipality. Because our sample size does not allow
us to study the choices among a large number of individual municipalities we categorize
our outcome variables into a dichotomous choice: the probability of residing in a low-tax
municipality and the probability of moving conditional on living either in a low-tax or a
high-tax municipality. Hypotheses A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix generalize Hypotheses 1
and 2 to such groups of municipalities.
We argue that workers just before the 5-year threshold are very similar to those just
above the threshold in terms of observable and unobservable characteristics such as in-
come, skills and tastes. This leads to an assignment into control and treatment group
which is as good as random locally around the threshold. Furthermore, the treatment is a
pure change in the local tax rates, leaving all other observable and unobservable municipal-
ity characteristics such as housing prices, local public goods provision and other amenities
unchanged. Our institutional setting therefore constitutes an exceptionally clean setting
to identify the causal effect of local income tax changes on individual location decisions
that is not confounded by other individual and municipal differences.
The following two subsections formally describe the fuzzy RDD (FRD) used for es-
timation and the plots used for illustration. We validate and discuss the identifying
assumptions of the fuzzy RDD later in Section 6.
4.1 Fuzzy RDD
The fuzzy RDD identifies average treatment effects for compliers at the threshold. In
our application these are foreign workers applying and receiving the permanent residence
status (permit C) at the threshold of five years. The estimated effects are consistent
under the standard assumptions of the fuzzy RDD: local randomization, a clear jump
in the probability of treatment, continuity of conditional expectations, excludability and
monotonicity. 11
11These identifying assumptions are formally stated in Hahn et al. (2001) and well described in Lee
and Lemieux (2010) or Imbens and Lemieux (2008).
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Our estimates are standard non-parametric (local linear) fuzzy RDD estimates fol-
lowing Porter (2003). We include sampling weights from the survey design.12 Under the
assumptions given the local average treatment effect (τ) is consistently estimated as13¤ E(τi|xi = xc) = ¤ limx→x+c E(yi|xi = x)− ¤ limx→x−c E(yi|xi = x)¤ limx→x+c E(wi|xi = x)− ¤ limx→x−c E(wi|xi = x) (14)
where y stands for the dependent variable of interest, w represents the treatment indicator,
x represents the assignment variable (duration of stay in Switzerland), xc represents the
threshold value (5 years), limx→x+c stands for the limit approaching the threshold from the
right hand side and limx→x−c that coming from the left hand side. In our application, w is
set to one if an individual holds permit C and to zero if not. E(wi|xi = x) stands for the
probability of holding the permanent residence status (permit C) after five years of stay.
E(yi|xi = x) stands for the conditional expectation of the outcome variable after five years
of stay. These limits are estimated by local linear regression using a triangular kernel,
which is the optimal weighting function in RDD settings because of its advantageous
properties at boundary points (for more details see Hahn et al. (2001) or Fan and Gijbels
(1996)). There are different procedures for an automatic optimal bandwidth choice in
non-parametric estimation. We choose the bandwidth to be as small as possible such that
the resulting curve still looks reasonably smooth. Although the optimal bandwidth would
vary in sample size, we choose to interpret the result for a fixed set of bandwidths to
keep results comparable. To validate that our results are robust to the bandwidth choice,
we report results using several bandwidths, where the last row, or column, in the result
tables in the Appendix reports discontinuity estimates based on the optimal bandwidth
as proposed in Calonico et al. (2014), and as in McCrary (2008) for the density estimates,
respectively.
Fuzzy RDD is often conceptionally linked to instrumental variables (see Angrist and
Imbens, 1994; Imbens and Lemieux, 2008). In the context of our application the first
stage is the probability that an individual is granted permanent residence status (permit
C) as a function of his duration of stay in Switzerland, the second stage is the residential
choice and moving probability, respectively, as a function of the residence status, and the
reduced form is the residential choice as a function of the duration of stay in Switzerland.
We additionally report parametric fuzzy RDD estimates of our basic estimates using
12We use the results of Harms and Duchesne (2010) to incorporate and correct for sampling weights in














where 1Πi is the inverse probability of inclusion. It comes out as 1.624 in our application.
13For details of LLR estimation in the RDD framework see Porter (2003) or Fan and Gijbels (1996)
for LLR estimation in general. Imbens and Lemieux (2008) and Lee and Lemieux (2010) provide a very
practical guide on the estimation and validation of an RDD.
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standard instrumental variable estimation incorporating survey weights.14 We follow Lee
and Lemieux (2010) and Angrist and Pischke (2009) in the specification, and use all
relevant observations of individuals within a bandwidth of 4 years around the threshold,
i.e. in the widest symmetric estimation window. The results of this specification are
reported in parallel to the non-parametric ones for comparison. In general we find that
the parametric estimates are somewhat lower, which could be attributed to the fact that
in these estimates every individual is weighted equally strongly even those farther away
from the threshold.15
Importantly, the discontinuity identifies the effect of the treatment for the respective
groups around the threshold. It is thus, in our application, the change in the outcome
variable resulting from the simultaneous change in the income tax rates at the threshold
value.
4.2 Discontinuity plots
As graphical illustration of the reduced form relationship, we fit a local linear estimate
to the residential choice of individuals (e.g., an indicator variable which takes the value 1
if the individual lives in a low-tax municipality and 0 otherwise), or their probability of
taking up the treatment (permit C) respectively, separately to both sides of the duration
threshold of 5 years, or 1825 days, in the country in a sharp RDD manner. Therefore,
we apply the following estimation equation to every estimation point separately to both





(yi − α− β(xi − x))2Kh (xi − x) (15)
where y is the dependent variable of interest, xi represents the commonly labeled assign-
ment variable (the duration of stay in our case), h represents the suitable bandwidth
h > 0, Kh (xi − x) represents the kernel weighting function at the estimation point x and





. We use a triangular kernel and take the sampling
weights in our data into account.
4.3 Structural estimation
Our institutional setting allows us to identify the local average effect of our tax treatment.
However, the magnitude of this treatment is not straightforward to interpret because our
treatment is a simultaneous change in the tax rates in all municipalities. We use the
theoretical model in Section 3 to estimate the structural parameter β and the implied
migration elasticity η which can be related to other estimates in the literature.
14More precisely, we regress the outcome variable on duration and a treatment dummy by two-stage
least squares instrumenting the treatment dummy by a dummy for being above the duration threshold
and allowing for different slopes in the duration of stay on both sides of the threshold.
15For these estimates we follow the specification in Angrist and Pischke (2009)[p.261ff] where, we choose
the polynomial order to be one or two.
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Equation (10) relates the observed effect on location choice from our treatment to the








dTim2 − dT i2|is1
)] (16)
where dT i2|is1 =
∑M
k=1 Pik2|is1dTik2.
Taking the parameter βi as well as the choice probabilities and the tax rate changes





[“Ps1“Pm2|s1 (d̂Tm2 − d̂T 2|s1)] (17)
with d̂T 2|s1 =
∑M
k=1
“Pk2|s1d̂T k2 where d̂Pm2 is the fuzzy RDD estimate for the estimation
sample, “Ps1 and “Pm2|s1 are, respectively, estimates of the unconditional and conditional
location choice probabilities from observed choice frequencies, and d̂Tm2 is the average in-
dividual tax change in municipalitym in the estimation sample. Alternatively, we base our
structural estimation of β on the effect of moving, theoretically derived in equation (12):
β̂ = −
d̂Pmove|m1“Pm2|m1 (d̂Tm2 − d̂T 2|m1) (18)
with d̂T 2|m1 =
∑M
s=1
“Ps2|m1d̂T s2. The estimate β̂ in equations (17) and (18) is m-specific
and hence there are M possible estimates.
With a structural estimate of β at hand, we estimate the migration elasticity for each
municipality m from equation (13) as
η̂m = β̂
1“Pm2 M∑s=1 “Pm2|s1(1− “Pm2|s2)“Ps1. (19)
We report the average elasticity across all municipalities weighted by the population
share “Pm2 in our sample, i.e. η̂ = ∑Mm=1 “Pm2η̂m. 95% confidence bounds for the structural
estimates are computed by a standard non-parametric bootstrap, using the percentile
method. Appendix B shows how we generalize the estimation of β̂, η̂m and η̂ to groups
of municipalities and to pooling across cantons.
4.4 Choice set and spatial pooling
Our institutional setting features an ordinary tax regime with different municipal tax
rates and a special tax regime with identical municipal tax rates within a canton. Our
theoretical model describes the choice of a municipality based on local tax rates and other
local and individual characteristics. Such a location choice model is best seen as a model
of choosing the place of residence given a workplace in the local labor market. To tractably
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match the institutional setting with the location choice model, we use the canton as the
choice set when we take the model to the data. For many large Swiss cities such as Zurich
and Bern, the canton indeed covers indeed most parts of the relevant commuting zone.16
As our sample is rather small, we pool the location choices over all cantons when we
estimate the probability of choosing the group of low-tax or high-tax municipalities in
the fuzzy RDD. We therefore define high- and low-tax municipalities within a canton as
described in Section 5.
In the structural estimation of β and the migration elasticity ηm in equations (17) to
(19), conditional and unconditional choice probabilities for individual municipalities m,
Pm2|s1 and Pm2, respectively, are therefore also defined relative to the cantonal choice set
and sum up to 1 within each canton. Choice probabilities are estimated by their sample
counterparts in the control sample, i.e. individuals with a duration of stay of up to 5
years.
5 Data
We use individual data from the largest Swiss labor market survey SAKE (“Schweizerische
Arbeitskräfteerhebung") augmented by individual income data from the social security
administration.17 The survey is organized as a rotating panel study. Each person is
interviewed annually over a period of five years and then replaced (BFS, 2004). The
linked administrative income data is essential for our analysis as we need to observe the
income threshold very precisely to define who is subject to the special tax regime and to
calculate the tax liability.
The sampling strategy with respect to foreign persons is not only geographically strat-
ified but also adjusted for demographic proportions, groups of foreigners, gender, and du-
ration of stay. Sample weights are therefore important and need to be accounted for in the
estimation. The SAKE dataset provides a weight variable which is meant to correct for
the stratification and complex survey design. It represents the inverse of the probability
of being included in the sample (wi = 1/πi).18
We use the pooled dataset for the years 2001 to 201319. The main variables in the
empirical analysis are:
16For the cities of Basel and Geneva this is clearly not the case because large parts of the commuting
zones belong to other cantons or even to other countries. However, Basel and Geneva are already excluded
from our sample because they deviate in other details from our institutional setting (see footnote 2.2).
17This linked dataset is called SESAM (“Synthese Erhebung Soziale Sicherheit und Arbeitsmarkt
(SESAM), BFS”).
18For the years 2001 to 2009, we use the weighting variable IXPXH, and for the years after 2010
IXPXHJ, since the annual dataset is used. This weight not only corrects for the consequences of the
stratification, but is additionally adjusted for the probability of a drop out before being sampled out and
further factors not discussed in detail here (for more details with respect to the creation of this weight
see BFS, 2004).
19We only use data up to 2013, as the practical implementation of the special tax scheme started
changing in several cantons due to a 2010 court judgment that this tax practice is discriminatory. However,
there is little public documentation on how the practice changed until it was changed on the federal level.
Therefore, we decided to use the time span in which it was certainly in force.
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• Location: This variable records the municipality of legal residence at the moment
of the individual is interviewed.
• Move: This variable is an indicator variable with a value of one if an individual
indicates having moved to another municipality within the last 12 months and zero
otherwise.
• Duration: This variable contains information about how long a foreign target person
has already lived in Switzerland. Respondents are first asked to indicate the year
and month they arrived in Switzerland. This information is converted to days using
approximations for missing information on the month (for details see BFS, 2012).
• Permit C : This variable is an indicator variable taking the value of one if an indi-
vidual indicates holding the permanent residence permit and zero otherwise.
• Gross income: This variable contains the yearly gross income of an individual, i.e.
income before taxes and social security contributions within the last 12 months
including 13th or 14th monthly salary, premiums and bonuses.
Additionally, we use several demographic variables for the definition of the sample and
the treatment groups, where needed.20 Descriptive statistics on the main variables can
be found in Table C.1.
Our basic estimation sample comprises individuals who meet all requirements for the
special tax scheme, except for the income, the duration of stay, and the permit type
restriction. Our sample includes foreign employees whose employment status is known,
who are at least 18 years old, and whose location of residence as well as nationality is
known.21 Swiss citizens including dual citizens and self-employed individuals are excluded
as this leads to ordinary taxation. The sample is further restricted to those holding either
permit B or C, excluding cases like asylum seekers. We also exclude those who are married
to a Swiss citizen or a dual citizen since they would be taxed ordinarily.22 We further
restrict our sample to foreigners residing in Switzerland for at least one year, so that we
can observe their yearly income. Individuals who own real estate are excluded as this
leads to ordinary taxation in the majority of cantons.23 Further, we restrict our sample
to those nationalities that are allowed to apply for permanent residence after 5 years of
stay, as our analysis will concentrate on the duration threshold of 5 years stay. We use
only observations for which the indicated duration of stay is reasonable, i.e. we exclude
observations for which the duration of stay in the same municipality exceeds the duration
20These are in particular: age, employment status, nationality, permit type, marital status, nationality
of spouse, information on real estate property, canton and municipality of residence.
21We exclude individuals who could not respond correctly when asked where their location of residence
is. Further, proxi-interviews are excluded, i.e. observations of individuals who were not interviewed in
person.
22One exception applies for the canton Ticino. Individuals married to a Swiss citizen are not excluded
if they reside in Ticino, because there this does not lead to ordinary taxation.
23This regulation applies to the cantons Argau, Vaud, Geneva, Jura, Lucerne, Uri, Schwyz, Nidwalden,
Glarus, Freiburg, Solothurn, Basel, Basel District and Schaffhausen.
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of stay in Switzerland by more than half a year. We further restrict the choice set to the
canton of residence and therefore only analyze individuals staying within a canton.24
We also exclude a range ±6000 Swiss francs around the income threshold of 120,000
Swiss francs from our analysis because we detected systematic income adaption in a small
band around the income threshold as discussed in Section 7.2.25 The experimental sample,
i.e. the individuals that switch from being untreated to being eligible for treatment after
five years, hence consists of foreign workers with incomes up to 114,000 Swiss francs.
As we would expect that reactions to income taxes are different across incomes, we
construct two income groups in the experimental sample. We define the low-income group
as having an income of below 60,000 Swiss francs (which is about the median income in the
experimental sample), while the high-income group has an income above 60,000 and below
114,000 Swiss francs. In the validation section we additionally use a placebo sample of
individuals with income between 126,000 and 200,000 Swiss francs. This group is already
taxed ordinarily from the beginning of their stay in Switzerland and should therefore
not react at the duration threshold. We exclude incomes above 200,000 Swiss francs to
exclude effects from extremely high incomes.
In addition to the described individual data, we use data on the combined federal,
cantonal and municipal average tax rate in the ordinary tax regime for the years 2001 to
2013. These tax rates are calculated by the Swiss Federal Tax Administration for the 813
largest Swiss municipalities. The calculation considers cantonal statutory tax rates as well
as canton-specific deductions, e.g., for children. The municipal tax rate is added as the
cantonal tax rate times the local tax multiplier. The federal tax is homogeneous across
Switzerland and is added to the cantonal and the municipal tax. These data have been
completed by Parchet (2014) to cover all municipalities in Switzerland and provide the
information on the income tax rates in Swiss municipalities in the ordinary tax scheme.
The income tax in the special tax scheme is calculated by the weighted income tax
rate for income groups within a canton. It is weighted by the population share of the
municipality relative to the cantonal population.26
The limited number of observations in our sample does not allow us to estimate the
choice among a large number of individual municipalities. We therefore categorize the
municipalities into two and four groups of municipalities based on the local tax rate:
• Low-tax : This is an indicator variable set to one if the income tax rate of the
municipality in the ordinary tax scheme is lower than the tax rate in the special tax
scheme of the corresponding canton and year.
24About 98% of individuals in our sample stay within the same canton.
25We additionally exclude individuals having an income in this range in the year before, to make sure
that we are not capturing strategic reactions of individuals who potentially systematically adapted their
income.
26The original tax multipliers for the special tax rate are not available for all cantons. Based on
the reported definitions of local tax authorities, we compared this measure to the original one, where
available, and it seems to be a valid approximation. The correlation between our generated measure and
the original data is about 0.91.
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• High-tax : This is an indicator variable set to one if the income tax rate of the
municipality in the ordinary tax scheme is higher than the tax rate in the special
tax scheme of the corresponding canton and year.
• Very low-tax (vl): This is an indicator variable set to one if the income tax rate of
the municipality in the ordinary tax scheme is lower than or equal to the median
tax rate of low-tax municipalities in a given canton and year.
• Medium low-tax (ml): This is an indicator variable set to one if the income tax rate
of the municipality in the ordinary tax scheme is higher than the median tax rate
of low-tax municipalities and lower than the tax rate in the special tax scheme in a
given canton and year.
• Medium high-tax (mh): This is an indicator variable set to one if the income tax rate
of the municipality in the ordinary tax scheme is lower than the median tax rate of
high-tax municipalities and higher than the tax rate in the special tax scheme in a
given canton and year.
• Very high-tax (vh): This is an indicator variable set to one if the income tax rate of
the municipality in the ordinary tax scheme is higher than or equal to the median
tax rate of high-tax municipalities in a given canton and year.
Our institutional setting guarantees that this classification of municipalities is the same
for all individuals despite the progressive nature of local tax rates.
Descriptive statistics of the net-of-tax changes within these groups are reported in
Table C.1 in Appendix C.
6 Results
This section reports the results of the individual’s reactions at the duration threshold,
exploiting the fuzzy RDD setting. We first test the theoretical prediction on location
choice and on mobility, and then report structural estimates of the migration elasticity.
Subsequently, we discuss the validity of the identifying assumptions behind the fuzzy
RDD.
6.1 Treatment Probability at the Duration Threshold
We start by validating one of the major identifying assumptions of our fuzzy RDD setting,
namely that the treatment probability exhibits a positive discontinuity at the duration
threshold of 5 years (or 1825 days) after arriving in the country.
To see whether there is a clear jump in the probability of being treated, i.e. the
probability of holding the permanent residence status (permit C) at the threshold value,
we fit two local linear smooths separately to both sides of the threshold value to an
indicator set to one for individuals holding permit C. The resulting pattern for the whole
sample is visualized in Figure 3. We see a clear positive discontinuity at the threshold
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Figure 3: Probability of holding permit C - first stage of fuzzy design. This graph shows local
linear smooths of the probability that an individual holds the permanent residence permit
around the duration threshold for the whole sample, using a bandwidth of 1460 days. The light
gray dashed lines indicate the 90% pointwise confidence bands and the gray dots raw weighted
averages of the dependent variable in half yearly bins. The corresponding discontinuity
estimate can be found in column (2) of Table C.2 in Appendix C.
threshold. Table C.2 in Appendix C reports the corresponding discontinuity estimate.
The discontinuity amounts to about 20 percentage points and is statistically significant.
We conclude that the threshold significantly and substantially changes the treatment
take-up and therefore constitutes a strong instrument for the treatment status. The
discontinuity in the take-up is not substantially different between individuals in high- and
low-tax municipalities or between low- and high-income individuals. We also find that
there is a considerable discontinuity in the probability to hold permit C at the threshold
for our always-treated placebo sample. As they do not face tax related incentives with
respect to permit C, this additionally validates that the treatment take-up is unlikely to
be driven by tax considerations.
6.2 Effect on location choice
In a next step, we exploit the fuzzy RDD to test whether a change in the tax regime,
and thus a simultaneous change in the tax rates of the whole choice set, indeed has the
theoretically derived consequences for individual’s residential choices (Hypothesis 1 and
its generalization to groups of municipalities in Hypothesis A.1).
Given that we use observational data, it is not possible to test Hypothesis 1, and
thus the change in the probability of residing in a particular municipality. However, its
generalization A.1, can be tested as it makes predictions about reactions in residential
choices for groups of municipalities.
We first group the municipalities into low- and high-tax municipalities. Hypothesis A.1
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Figure 4: Probability of residing in a low-tax municipality for the experimental sample
around the threshold value. The graph shows local linear smooths of the probability that an
individual resides in a low-tax municipality for the experimental sample, using a bandwidth of
1460 days (4 years). The light gray dashed lines indicate the 90% pointwise confidence bands
and the gray dots raw weighted averages of the dependent variable in half yearly bins.
Table 1: Probability of residing in a low-tax municipality
All Low income High income
non- non- non-
parametric parametric parametric parametric parametric parametric
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Effect ∆P -0.064 -0.021 -0.159 -0.026 -0.008 -0.023
(0.096) (0.076) (0.180) (0.140) (0.112) (0.086)
N left 7988 7988 3217 3217 4771 4771
N right 4468 4468 1775 1775 2693 2693
Notes: Fuzzy RDD estimates of the probability that an individual resides in a low-tax municipality for
different income groups. Nonparametric means fuzzy RDD with local-linear regression using a trian-
gular kernel, while parametric means a linear instrumental variable estimation. All estimates include
a bandwidth of 1460 days (4years) and account for sampling weights. Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** p < .01.
pared to untreated individuals. Individuals just above the duration threshold are more
likely to be treated than individuals just before the threshold and should hence have a
higher probability of residing in a low-tax municipality. Figure 4 visualizes the reduced-
form relationship between the outcome variable and the eligibility of treatment, i.e. the
choice probability as a function of the duration of stay in Switzerland for the experimental
sample around the threshold value.27 The probability that an individual resides in a low-
tax municipality is virtually unchanged at the duration threshold of 5 years (1825 days).
Table 1 reports the corresponding non-parametric and parametric fuzzy RDD estimate
in columns (1) and (2). The point estimates are slightly negative but not significantly
different from zero at any usual level of significance.
27Note that the magnitude and confidence bounds of the discontinuity in the reduced form figures do
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(b) Probability of residing in a
very high-tax municipality
Figure 5: Probability that an individual resides in the respective municipality type for the
high-income experimental sample around the threshold value. These graphs show local linear
smooths of the probability that an individual resides in the respective municipality type for the
high-income experimental sample, using a bandwidth of 1460 days. The light gray dashed lines
indicate the 90% pointwise confidence bands and the gray dots raw weighted averages of the
dependent variable in half yearly bins.
Income tax rates in Switzerland are highly progressive, as exemplified for the canton
of Zurich in Figure 2. We expect a stronger effect for higher income individuals than for
lower income individuals because the former are treated with much larger changes in tax
rates. Progressive tax rates lead mechanically to stronger effects on location choice for
higher income individuals in a location-choice model with homothetic preferences as in
footnote 8.28
Columns (3) and (4) in Table 1 show the fuzzy RDD estimates for low-income house-
holds with incomes below 60,000 Swiss francs, while columns (5) and (6) show those for
high-income individuals with incomes between 60 and 114 thousand Swiss francs. Again,
we see no systematic effect at the duration threshold.
In many municipalities the tax changes induced by the treatment are very small. We
therefore focus next on very low-tax municipalities with large reductions in tax rates and
on very high-tax municipalities with large increases in tax rates. Hypothesis 1 and its
generalization Hypothesis A.1 (in Appendix A.3) predict that the probability of choosing
a very low-tax municipality increases from treatment while the probability of choosing a
very high-tax municipality decreases.29 Figure 5 shows the reduced form effects for these
two types of municipalities for high-income individuals, i.e. individuals in the experimen-
tal sample with incomes between 60k and 114k Swiss francs. Figure 5(a) documents a
small and non-significant rise in the probability of choosing a very low-tax municipal-
ity at the duration threshold and Figure 5(b) a significant and substantial drop in the
28In reality, utility over housing and other goods is typically not homothetic with decreasing budget
shares of housing with increasing income. Such non-homothetic preferences are a further reason for the
effect to increase with income as discussed in Schmidheiny (2006).
29These categories are defined in Section 5.
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Table 2: Probability of residing in a very low-tax or very high-tax municipality
All Low income High income
non- non- non-
parametric parametric parametric parametric parametric parametric
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7)
(a) Probability of residing in a very low-tax municipality:
Effect ∆P 0.071 0.076 0.009 0.099 0.110 0.065
(0.085) (0.064) (0.153) (0.122) (0.101) (0.071)
(b) Probability of residing in a very high-tax municipality:
Effect ∆P -0.096 -0.093 0.115 0.020 -0.215** -0.159**
(0.085) (0.070) (0.154) (0.133) (0.101) (0.080)
N left 7988 7988 3217 3217 4771 4771
N right 4468 4468 1775 1775 2693 2693
Notes: Fuzzy RDD estimates of the probability that an individual resides in the respective municipality
type for different income groups. Nonparametric means fuzzy RDD with local-linear regression using a
triangular kernel, while parametric means a linear instrumental variable estimation. All estimates include
a bandwidth of 1460 days (4years) and account for sampling weights. Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** p < .01.
probability of choosing a very high-tax municipality. The corresponding fuzzy RDD esti-
mates are presented in Table 2 columns (5) and (6). These estimates report a, not very
precisely estimated, though significant (p < 5%) and substantial drop for very high-tax
municipalities of about 15 to 20 percentage points and a non-significant increase for very
low-tax municipalities. High-income individuals therefore systematically shy away from
municipalities in which they would experience a sharp increase in tax rates after being
granted permanent residence status. However, high income individuals are, on average,
not significantly more likely to choose a very low-tax municipalities which would offer a
sharp decrease in tax rates after being granted permanent residence status. This suggests
that they rather sort into the two middle categories, i.e. medium high- and medium
low-tax municipalities, which offer more attractive tax rates and still reasonable housing
prices. Table 2 also reports estimates for all incomes in the experimental group (columns
1 and 2) and for low-income households only (columns 3 and 4). We do not find any
systematic reactions in the sample of low-income earners and in the combined samples
with all income groups.
24
Table 3: Probability of moving away from a high- or low-tax municipality
All Low income High income
non- non- non-
parametric parametric parametric parametric parametric parametric
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(a) Probability of moving away from a low-tax municipality:
Effect ∆P 0.007 0.086 0.081 0.215** -0.034 -0.001
(0.061) (0.053) (0.118) (0.106) (0.069) (0.053)
N left 4061 4061 1731 1731 2330 2330
N right 2215 2215 944 944 1271 1271
(b) Probability of moving away from a high-tax municipality
Effect ∆P 0.271*** 0.212*** 0.144 0.135 0.339*** 0.256***
(0.082) (0.071) (0.150) (0.099) (0.098) (0.097)
N left 3927 3927 1486 1486 2441 2441
N right 2253 2253 831 831 1422 1422
Notes: Fuzzy RDD estimates of the probability of moving given that individuals were residing in the re-
spective municipality type for different income groups. Nonparametric means fuzzy RDD with local-linear
regression using a triangular kernel, while parametric means a linear instrumental variable estimation.
All estimates include a bandwidth of 1460 days (4years) and account for sampling weights. Standard
errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.1, ** 0.01 < p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
6.3 Effect on mobility
We next study directly whether the change in the tax regime, and thus a simultaneous
change in all local tax rates, induces individuals to systematically move away. Hypothesis
2 and its generalization Hypothesis A.2 (in Appendix A.6) predicts that the treatment
increases the mobility of individuals who live in municipalities with high ordinary tax
rates (below average net-of-tax rate) while it decreases the mobility of individuals who
live in municipalities with low ordinary tax rates (above average net-of-tax rate). Hence,
individuals move away from places that become less attractive and stay in places that
become more attractive.
We repeat the former fuzzy RDD estimates for individuals’ mobility decision. The
dependent variable is an indicator set to one if an individual moved to another municipality
within the last 12 months. Table 3 reports the non-parametric and parametric fuzzy
RDD estimates for the whole experimental sample in columns (1) and (2), respectively.
Panel (a) shows the effect for individuals living in low-tax municipalities when receiving
the permanent residence permit and panel (b) those for individuals living in high-tax
municipalities. We find a positive and significant (p < 0.01) jump in the probability of
moving for those residing in a high-tax municipality of between 22 and 28 percentage
points but no clear reactions for individuals residing in low-tax municipalities.
Columns (3) to (6) report separate estimates for low-income and high-income indi-
viduals. As in the analysis of residential choices in Section 6.2, we expect a stronger
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(b) Probability of moving away from a
high-tax municipality
Figure 6: Probability of moving given the individual was residing in the respective
municipality type for the high-income experimental sample around the threshold value. These
graphs show local linear smooths of the probability of moving conditioning on the previous
municipality type for the high-income experimental sample using a bandwidth of 1460 days (4
years). The light gray dashed lines indicate the 90% pointwise confidence bands and the gray
dots raw weighted averages of the dependent variable in half yearly bins.
moving probability of up to 34 percentage points for high-income individuals in high-tax
municipalities, but again no significant effect for low-income individuals. The graphs in
Figure 6 show the reduced form relationship for high-income individuals. We see a steep
and significant increase in the moving probability for high-income individuals residing in
high-tax municipalities and a very small not significant decrease for high income individ-
uals in low-tax municipalities. Note that we would expect the probability of moving to
react only locally around the threshold, as the incentives to move arise just after receiving
the permanent residence permit and the moving probability should return to its old level
once individuals have adapted to the new circumstances and thus for higher durations of
stay.
We next divide the municipalities into four municipality groups: very low-tax, medium
low-tax, medium high-tax and very high-tax municipalities. Hypothesis 2 (Appendix A.2)
predicts that the probability of moving should fall in both low-tax groups and increase
in both high-tax groups. We expect that the effect is stronger in the extreme groups,
where the tax rate changes are strongest. Table 4 reports the fuzzy RDD estimates for
these four groups in panels (a) to (d) separately for all incomes in columns (1) and (2),
for low-income individuals in columns (3) and (4) and for high-income individuals in
columns (5) and (6). We see a very strong and significant (p < 0.01) positive effect for
individuals in the highest-tax municipalities with most of the effect stemming from high-
income individuals. According to the non-parametric fuzzy RDD estimate, high-income
individuals living in very high-tax municipalities are 35 to 52 percentage points more
likely to move when treated after 5 years, with a 95% confidence interval from 23 to 80
percentage points, for the local linear estimates. In line with the theoretical prediction,
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Table 4: Probability of moving away from a particular municipality for four groups of
municipalities
All Low income High income
non- non- non-
parametric parametric parametric parametric parametric parametric
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7)
(a) Probability of moving away from a very low-tax municipality:
Effect ∆P -0.001 0.094 -0.036 0.234 0.015 0.023
(0 .098) (0.080) (0.271) (0.184) (0.097) (0.078)
N left 2108 2108 787 787 1321 1321
N right 1154 1154 431 431 723 723
(b) Probability of moving away from a medium low-tax municipality:
Effect ∆P 0.012 0.072 0.133 0.192 -0.090 -0.033
(0.074) (0.069) (0.115) (0.126) (0.097) (0.072)
N left 1953 1953 944 944 1009 1009
N right 1061 1061 513 513 548 548
(c) Probability of moving away from a medium high-tax municipality:
Effect ∆P 0.113 0.123 0.075 0.068 0.130 0.152*
(0.119) (0.076) (0.233) (0.141) (0.138) (0.089)
N left 1781 1781 728 728 1053 1053
N right 1065 1065 386 386 679 679
(d) Probability of moving away from a very high-tax municipality:
Effect ∆P 0.401*** 0.292** 0.194 0.190 0.517*** 0.356**
(0.116) (0.119) (0.199) (0.136) (0.145) (0.178)
N left 2146 2146 758 758 1388 1388
N right 1188 1188 445 445 743 743
Notes: Fuzzy RDD estimates of the probability of moving given the individuals were residing in the re-
spective municipality type for different income groups. Nonparametric means fuzzy RDD with local-linear
regression using a triangular kernel, while parametric means a linear instrumental variable estimation.
All estimates include a bandwidth of 1460 days (4years) and account for sampling weights. Standard
errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** p < .01.
the estimates for individuals living in medium high-tax municipalities are also positive
though smaller and not significant at the 5% level. For individuals in medium low-tax
and very low-tax municipalities, the effects tend to be negative but not systematically and
not significant even at the 10% level. Figure 7 visualizes these findings for high-income
individuals.
In sum, we find a sharp increase in mobility of households that experience a strong
increase in their income tax rates, i.e. high-income households in very high-tax munici-
palities and a weak increase for households that experience a mild increase in tax rates,
low-income households in medium high-tax municipality. This is exactly what our theory
predicts about residents of high-tax municipalities. However, we do not find strong ef-





















730 1095 1460 1825 2190 2555 2920
 
Duration of stay (days)
(a) Probability of moving away from a





















730 1095 1460 1825 2190 2555 2920
 
Duration of stay (days)
(b) Probability of moving away from a






















730 1095 1460 1825 2190 2555 2920
 
Duration of stay (days)





















730 1095 1460 1825 2190 2555 2920
 
Duration of stay (days)
(d) Probability of moving away from a
very high-tax municipality
Figure 7: Probability of moving given the individuals were residing in the respective
municipality type for the high-income experimental sample around the threshold value. These
graphs show local linear smooths of the probability of moving conditioning on the previous
municipality type for the high-income experimental sample using a bandwidth of 1460 days.
The light gray dashed lines indicate the 90% pointwise confidence bands and the gray dots raw
weighted averages of the dependent variable in half yearly bins.
individuals who experience the strongest decline in tax rates, i.e. high-income individuals
in the lowest-tax municipalities. There seems to be an asymmetric mobility response to
tax increases and decreases which is not in line with our theoretical prediction.
6.4 More effect heterogeneity
Our theoretical model would further predict that the mobility response is smaller for
individuals with higher moving costs. In this section, we test this hypothesis by comparing
individuals with and without children living in the household. Households with children
are arguably less spatially mobile because of the social costs involved in changing schools
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Figure 8: Probability of moving away from a high-tax municipality for individuals with and
without children in the household and for three income groups. Estimation results can be
found in Table C.3 in Appendix C.
Figure 8 summarizes the fuzzy RDD estimates reported in Table C.3 in Appendix C.
We find that the effect is indeed stronger for treated individuals in households without
children. For individuals with income above 120k Swiss francs, i.e. the placebo sample,
there is no effect, either with or without children in the household.
6.5 Robustness
First, to check that our results are not driven by the chosen bandwidth of the non-
parametric estimates, we report the main mobility estimates for all income groups and all
municipality types for diverse bandwidths in Tables C.6, C.7, and C.8 in Appendix C. Of
these, the last bandwidth is the optimal one, following the procedure of Calonico et al.
(2014). We do not find our estimates to be particularly sensitive to bandwidth choice.
Second, to check whether the parametric fuzzy RDD estimates are not driven by
functional form assumptions, we additionally control for second order polynomials of the
forcing variable as well as for individual characteristics in Table C.9 in Appendix C. In
general, we find that the parametric estimates tend to be lower. However, the main
pattern persists and is rather similar in magnitude and significance.
6.6 Validation of RDD
This section discusses the validity of the fuzzy RDD as causal estimates by inspecting the
main assumptions.
First, we address the validity of the local randomization around the duration thresh-
old. Every individual in our sample will automatically cross the threshold after five years
of stay if she/he intends to stay in Switzerland. The only possibility of manipulation
would be to emigrate from Switzerland shortly before crossing the threshold and then to
immigrate into Switzerland again. We consider this manipulation as rather unrealistic be-
cause the individual would have to wait another 5 years before being granted permanent
29
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Figure 9: Validation of local randomization around the threshold. Figure 9a shows local
likelihood density estimates of the duration of stay using bandwidth = 360, accounting for
survey weights and, separately, from both sides of the duration threshold of 1825 days, or 5
years. The corresponding density discontinuity estimates can be found in row (b) of Table C.14
in Appendix C. Figure 9b presents local linear smooths of the probability of individuals around
the threshold being highly educated using the whole sample and a bandwidth of 1460 days.
The light gray dashed lines indicate the 90% pointwise confidence bands and the gray dots raw
weighted averages of the dependent variable in half yearly bins. The corresponding
discontinuity estimate can be found in column (12) of Table C.5 in Appendix C.
residence status (permit C) which comes with much more important benefits than the tax
treatment, as discussed above. We nevertheless validate the local randomization assump-
tion empirically by testing for a discontinuity in the distribution of the duration of stay
at the threshold value. Any discontinuity at the threshold value could indicate systematic
sorting and a violation of the local randomization assumption (see, e.g, McCrary, 2008).30
Figure 9(a) visually confirms that there is no discontinuity in the duration density at the
threshold (detailed results are reported in Table C.14 in Appendix C). Individuals could
still be systematically sorted around the threshold. We therefore check whether individ-
uals’ observable characteristics are continuous around the duration threshold. Table C.5
and Figure C.1 in Appendix C show sharp RDD estimates for age, gender, household size,
education, and contract type. Figure 9(b) visualizes this test for education. We do not
find any substantial and significant discontinuities in the tested covariates. We conclude
that the treatment group just after the threshold is comparable to the control group just
before the threshold, when it comes to observable characteristics.
Second, we check the validity of the continuity and excludability assumptions. In our
application this means checking whether there are any other discontinuities after 5 years
30Our estimates for the discontinuity in the density are based on the empirical likelihood approach
derived in Otsu et al. (2013). In order to adjust the estimates for the sampling weights in our data,
we multiply the kernel weights by the sampling weights in the summation part of the FOC. For the
graphic evidence we apply the local likelihood implementation (locfit) in the Chronux software package
























730 1095 1460 1825 2190 2555 2920
 
Duration of stay (days)
(a) Probability of moving away from a



















730 1095 1460 1825 2190 2555 2920
 
Duration of stay (days)
(b) Probability of moving away from a
very high-tax municipality
Figure 10: Probability of moving given the individual was residing in the respective
municipality type for the placebo sample around the threshold value. These graphs show local
linear smooths of the probability of moving conditioning on the previous municipality type for
the high-income experimental sample using a bandwidth of 1460 days (4 years). The light gray
dashed lines indicate the 90% pointwise confidence bands and the gray dots raw weighted
averages of the dependent variable in half yearly bins.
of stay, and whether the effect from being granted permanent resident status (permit C) is
really due to changes in tax rates and not confounded with other changes that take place
at the same time. There may by systematic changes in the preferences of individuals after
5 years in the country or when they receive permanent resident status in the country.
For example, an individual may decide to start a family and have children or buy a
home. We check this by performing a fuzzy RDD in a placebo sample of always treated
individuals, i.e. foreigners with incomes above 126,000 Swiss francs but otherwise the
same sample restrictions as our experimental sample of individuals with incomes below
114,000 Swiss francs. Foreigners with incomes above 126,000 Swiss francs are eligible for
permanent resident status (permit C) in the exact same way as individuals with incomes
below 114,000 Swiss francs. Hence they experience exactly the same changes at the 5-
year threshold except for the change in the tax treatment because they are already in the
ordinary tax regime. Fuzzy RDD estimates using foreigners with income above 126,000
Swiss francs can therefore serve as a placebo test. Table 5 shows the results of this
placebo test and Figure 10 visualizes the reduced form relationship for the very high and
very low-tax municipalities. We do not find any significant discontinuity in the placebo
group, which suggests that there is no other discontinuity after 5 years that explains the
estimated effect in the treated group, nor can this effect be confounded with other benefits
of the permanent residence status.
Third, we argue that the monotonicity assumption is evidently given in our setting.
The incentive to hold permit C increases with the time spent in the country. In our
view it is not conceivable that the crossing of the threshold reduces these incentives for a
particular group. Therefore, the incentives to accept the treatment seem to work in one
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Table 5: Probability of moving away from a particular municipality for 4 municipality groups
Probability of moving Probability of moving Probability of moving Probability of moving
from a from a from a from a
very high-tax medium high-tax medium low-tax very low-tax
non- non- non- non-
parametric parametric parametric parametric parametric parametric parametric parametric
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Effect ∆P 0.052 0.034 -0.079 -0.013 -0.023 -0.005 -0.000 0.014
(0.147) (0.091) (0.106) (0.078) (0.153) (0.101) (0.124) (0.076)
N left 303 303 170 170 216 216 373 373
N right 184 184 132 132 139 139 212 212
Notes: Fuzzy RDD estimates of the probability of moving given individuals were residing in the cor-
responding municipality type for the quasi-placebo group, i.e. individuals with an income above 126k.
Nonparametric means fuzzy RDD with local-linear regression using a triangular kernel, while parametric
means a linear instrumental variable estimation. All estimates include a bandwidth of 1460 days (4years)
and account for sampling weights. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1,
** .01 < p < .05, *** p < .01.
direction. Consistently, we observe in Figure 3 that the probability of holding permit C
increases, the longer individuals stay in Switzerland.
Finally, we check whether the estimated discontinuities at the duration threshold of
five years are not some artefact of our estimation procedure. We therefore repeat the
main estimates with four types of municipalities for placebo-thresholds at four and six
years as a falsification test. Results for the high income group are reported in Tables C.10
and C.11 for the mobility estimates and in Tables C.12 and C.13 for the residential choice
estimates. We find no significant jumps in the probability at these placebo-thresholds.
7 Discussion
This section addresses the interpretation of the magnitude of the identified effects and
further challenges for the causal interpretation of our estimated effects.
7.1 Implied migration elasticity
Our quasi-experimental institutional setting allows us to estimate migration elasticities
from the causal treatment effects estimated in section 6 as described in Section 4.3.
Table C.4 in the Appendix reports elasticity estimates based on two different esti-
mated treatment effects: Based on the estimated effect on the probability of residing in a
very high-tax municipality, we estimate a value of 22.3 for the implied average migration
elasticity. This migration elasticity means that an increase in the local net-of-tax rate by
1% from, e.g., 86 to 87 percentage points leads to an increase in the foreign population
by 22.3%. This point estimate is, however, very imprecise with a 95% confidence interval
ranging from 1.98 to 45.86. Alternatively, based on the estimated effect on the probability
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of moving away from a very high-tax municipality, we estimate an elasticity of 26.9 with
a 95% confidence interval ranging from 7.2 to 65.9. The elasticity estimates based on
location choice and mobility decisions in very low -tax municipalities are not significantly
different from 0 as are the underlying estimated treatment effects.
Our point estimates of the migration elasticity are larger by an order of magnitude
compared to the estimates in the literature. Elasticities for the mobility of domestic
individuals within countries range between 0.03 and 0.4 (see Kleven et al., 2013; Akcigit
et al., 2016; Moretti and Wilson, 2017; Agrawal and Foremny, 2017) while elasticities
for the mobility of foreign individuals within countries or for international mobility tend
to be higher with a range between 1 and 2 (see, e.g., Kleven et al., 2013, 2014; Akcigit
et al., 2016). Our large point estimates are very imprecisely estimated and therefore not
very informative beyond being significantly positive. We still see plausible arguments why
migration elasticities in our context may be higher than the ones in the previous literature:
First, we are estimating mobility reactions between municipalities. Moving costs are
therefore arguably lower and migration responses likely stronger than across states or
countries. Second, tax rate differentials across Swiss municipalities have been remarkably
stable over decades. The shift from special to ordinary taxation, implies therefore a known
permanent change in the tax rates which has likely stronger effects than temporary or
volatile changes. Third, our treatment is a very salient change in the tax regime because
previously withheld income taxes are now invoiced after filing taxes. Fourth, we are
investigating the mobility reactions of recently immigrated foreigners which are likely to
have fewer social ties and hence lower migration costs than the general population. It is
also important to keep in mind that our RDD estimates are inherently local and apply to
foreigners in Switzerland after 5 years of stay and thus might be strongly affected by the
investigated institutional setting. Consequently, any extrapolation has to be taken with
caution.
7.2 Income response at the income threshold
As described in Section 2, there are two thresholds that determine whether foreign workers
in Switzerland are subject to the ordinary or the special tax regime: a duration threshold
after 5 years of stay and an income threshold at 120,000 Swiss francs. We show in this
subsection that the income threshold creates incentives that lead workers to strategically
adjust earnings in a narrow band around the threshold. Individuals with observed incomes
just below or just above the threshold are therefore potentially individuals who system-
atically adapted their income and might be systematically different from non-adapting
individuals. To avoid a bias from sample selection in our fuzzy RDD estimates, we ex-
clude a range of ±6000 of incomes around the threshold of 120,000 Swiss francs from both
our experiment sample and our placebo sample.
Foreigners with a given income below the income threshold have an incentive to choose
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municipality
Figure 11: Probability that an individual resides in a low-tax municipality. Foreigners not
holding the permanent residence status (permit C) during their first five years in Switzerland.
Local linear regression separately at both sides of the income threshold using a bandwidth 10k
and taking sampling weights into account.The light gray dashed lines indicate the 90%
pointwise confidence bands and the gray dots raw weighted averages of the dependent variable
in bins of 5k.
to the high tax rate but benefit from the lower housing prices in these municipalities. A
sharp RDD around the income threshold should therefore reveal a positive jump in the
probability of living in a low-tax municipality. We inspect this visually in Figure 11(a),
where we indeed find a positive discontinuity, reported in the estimates in Table C.16 in
Appendix C. The observed discontinuity is, however, not the result of a level-shift but
of a sharp decline in the probability from the left of the threshold and a sharp increase
from the right. Outside of a narrow income band of about ±6k around the threshold,
the probability of choosing a low-tax municipality seems unaffected. This impression
is confirmed when a range of ±6k is excluded around the threshold in Table C.16 in
Appendix C. After the exclusion the probabilities on both sides do not systematically
differ anymore. This conclusion also holds when analyzing the probability of residing in a
very low-tax municipality, where the incentives are even stronger. The results can be found
in Figure 11(b) and Table C.16 in Appendix C. The observed pattern is consistent with
systematic income adaption at the income threshold: foreigners in low-tax municipalities
seek to push their income above the threshold to profit from the lower ordinary tax
rates; foreigners in high-tax municipalities seek to keep their income below the threshold
to benefit from the lower special tax rate. This is also what we find when testing for
a discontinuity in the income distribution at the income threshold (see Figure C.2): the
income distributions feature excess mass at the preferential side, i.e., just below the income
threshold in high-tax municipalities and just above it in low-tax municipalities.
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7.3 Anticipated moving
Foreigners in our experimental sample could in principle already move before the 5-year
threshold in anticipation of the change in the tax regime after 5 years which is known
to the informed migrant. In the presence of anticipation, our estimated effect at the
threshold would be biased. In this section, we argue theoretically that our estimated
effect would be biased towards zero.
In the absence of moving costs, the location decision at any point in time, only de-
pends on the tax rates of that point in time and individuals do not have an incentive
to anticipate moving to a municipality which will be optimal in later periods. In the
presence of moving costs, however, future tax rates may affect today’s location decision.
For simplicity, consider a deterministic version of our theoretical model in Section 3 with
a pre-treatment period t = 1 and a post-treatment period t = 2 and two municipalities
m = `, h, where municipality ` has low ordinary tax rates and municipality h high or-
dinary tax rates. Consider now an individual who would prefer living in the high-tax
municipality in period 1, i.e Vh1 > V`1, and living in a low-tax municipality in period 2,
i.e Vh2 < V`2. Choosing the low-tax municipality in period 1 would incur a static loss
of ∆V1 = Vh1 − V`1 and choosing the low-tax municipality in period 2 would realise a
static gain of ∆V2 = V`2−Vh2. Considering moving costs c, this individual would already
initially choose a low-tax municipality and stay there if the loss ∆V1 from living in a
sub-optimal location in period 1 is smaller than both the discounted moving cost ρ · c and
the discounted gain ρ ·∆V2 from living in the optimally location in period 2, where ρ is
the discount factor. A forward looking individual is therefore more likely to anticipate if
moving costs are high and if the gain in period 2 is high.
In our results on location choices visualized in Figure 5, initial anticipation would
show up as a parallel upward shift to the left of the threshold in Figure (a) and a parallel
downward shift to the left of the threshold in Figure (b). The existence of a clear jump
in both figures rules out full anticipation in particular in Figure (b) where the jump is
statistically significant. However, partial anticipation could be present and would bias
our estimated effects towards zero.
An individual could in principle also anticipate at some later point during the first five
years in Switzerland. However, such anticipation is theoretically not beneficial because
it incurs both a static loss and moving costs. In this case, it would be best to stay in
the statically optimal location for the whole pre-treatment period and move just after 5
years. Later anticipation would show up in Figure 5 as an increase of the slope to the
left of the threshold in Figure(a) and a decrease of the slope in Figure (b). Later partial
anticipation would also bias our estimated effects towards zero.
Note that initial anticipation requires foreign workers to understand the geography
of municipal income tax differentials already when they arrive in Switzerland. As most
foreigners have never experienced such decentralized taxation, they likely learn about the
Swiss tax regime only later, at the latest with their first tax invoice when switching to
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ordinary taxation after five years in the country. Such information frictions also limit the
scope for a bias from anticipation.
7.4 Initial selection into municipalities
Our fuzzy RDD results at the duration threshold on mobility in Section 6.3 show that the
effect of the tax treatment is different for foreigners in low-tax municipalities than for those
in high-tax municipalities. We explain the opposing effect with the opposing incentives in
the two types of municipalities. However, the observed difference could in principle also
stem from systematic initial selection into low-tax municipalities. In combination with
heterogeneous effects, such initial selection could also explain the estimated differences
between the effects in low-tax vs. high-tax municipalities.
First, we directly test for initial selection on observables by estimating a linear proba-
bility model for the probability of residing in a low-tax municipality or in a very low-tax
municipality, respectively, as a function of demographic variables (age, marital status,
children), income, educational attainment, type of work contract, occupational character-
istics, and industry sector. We restrict this estimation to foreign employees with incomes
below 114,000 Swiss francs, i.e. foreign workers that are subject to the special foreigners
tax regime below the 5-year duration threshold and to the ordinary tax regime after the
duration threshold.31 The results are reported in Table C.15 in the Appendix. Columns
(1) and (2) show the estimated models for foreign employees that stayed in Switzerland
for less than 2 years. The initial location choice is not significantly related to education,
occupation or industry sector and only weakly related to demographic variables. Columns
(3) and (4) estimate the same models for foreign employees that stayed in Switzerland
for more than 8 years. This later location choice is significantly related to occupation,
industry sector and education. The demographic controls also have more predictive power
in the later group. A test on the joint hypothesis that all demographic coefficients are
zero yields an F-statistic of 1.36 (p=0.088) and 1.44 (p=0.0547) in columns (1) and (2),
respectively, and an F-statistic of 5.46 (p=0.000) and 2.16 (p=0.0002) in columns (3) and
(4). Hence, foreign employees do only weakly sort into municipalities based on the level
of ordinary local tax rates when they arrive in Switzerland and when they are not sub-
ject to the ordinary tax rates under the special tax regime. However, foreign employees
systematically sort into municipalities based on the ordinary local tax rates after they
passed the duration threshold and when they are subject to the ordinary tax rates. We
conclude that we cannot find evidence of strong systematic selection into a particular
municipality type that could explain the difference between the effects in low-tax and
high-tax municipalities.
Second, our estimated effects allow us to test against the null hypothesis that tax
rate changes have no effect on the mobility of individuals even when initial sorting were
31We also restrict the group to individuals with incomes above 10,000 Swiss francs because local tax
rates are virtually zero for the ones below.
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present. Under the null hypothesis, we should not see any systematic effect on mobility
at the threshold neither in low-tax nor in high-tax municipalities. Even for a selective
local population, the only difference before and after the duration threshold is the change
in local tax rates. In the presence of initial sorting, our estimated causal effects would,
however, need to be interpreted as local effects for the respective populations.
8 Conclusion
We study residential choice and residential mobility responses to local income taxes in a
quasi-experimental setting generated by a special foreigners’ tax regime in Switzerland.
Ordinary income tax rates in Switzerland differ across the 26 cantons and the roughly
2500 municipalities. Foreigners whose yearly gross income is below 120,000 Swiss francs
(around 130,000 US-Dollars in 2015) are, however, subject to a special foreigners’ tax
regime until they obtain a permanent residence permit, for which they can apply after
five years of stay in Switzerland. Taxpayers in the special tax regime face an income
tax rate that does not differ across the municipalities within a canton. This institutional
setting generates a deterministic duration threshold at 5 years of stay in the country when
foreigners in the special tax regime with identical tax rates across space become suddenly
eligible for the ordinary tax scheme with tax rates that differ across space. We exploit
this threshold by applying a fuzzy regression discontinuity design (RDD) to estimate the
causal effect from a simultaneous change of the local income tax rates in all municipalities.
We document strong responses in both location choices and moving decisions for high-
income earners, but no effects for low-income earners. High income foreigners receiving the
permanent residence permit at the 5-year threshold are systematically less likely to reside
in one of the municipalities with the highest local tax rates and are systematically more
likely to move away from a very high-tax municipality when compared to their control
group just below the threshold value. Furthermore, we find that this effect is strongest
for households without children, which arguably have lower moving costs. Different from
the theoretical prediction, however, we do not find a significant effect on the moving
probability for individuals residing in one of the lowest-tax municipalities suggesting an
asymmetric response to tax increases and tax decreases. Our fuzzy RDD estimates are
robust to a series of robustness tests using different bandwidths and functional forms, pass
placebo tests with counterfactual threshold values and with an always treated population.
Our theoretical framework also allows us to estimate the migration elasticity with
respect to the net-of-tax rate from the fuzzy RDD estimates. The resulting elasticities are
considerably higher than the values found in the literature so far. However, our estimates
are very imprecise and therefore not very informative beyond being significantly positive.
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A Appendix Theory
This appendix derives the main equations of our theoretical model and generalizes the
results to groups of municipalities. We will ignore the individual identifier i for ease of
exposition in the appendix.
We partition the ordered municipalities into G groups such that all municipalities in
group g have (weakly) lower tax rates than all municipalities in group g + 1. The set Gg
contains all municipalities that belong to group g. Consequently,
∆TG12 ≥ ... ≥ ∆TGg2 ≥ ... ≥ ∆TGG2 (20)
where ∆TGg2 is any (weighted) average over all net-of-tax rate changes ∆Tm2 of the
municipalities within group g.
The effect of a change in the net-of-tax rate Tm2 of a particular municipality m on the
conditional probability of choosing this destination municipality m is positive
∂Pm2|s1
∂Tm2
= β · Pm2|s1 · (1− Pm2|s1) > 0 (21)
while the effect of a change in the net-of-tax rate Tk2 in another municipality k 6= m on
choosing municipality m is negative
∂Pm2|s1
∂Tk2
= −β · Pm2|s1 · Pk2|s1 < 0. (22)
A.1 Derivation of Eq. (10)




(Pm2|s1 · Ps1). (23)
The effect of an increase in the net-of-tax rate Tm2 of a particular municipality m on





































The effect of the simultaneous change of all tax rates τk2 and hence all net-of-tax rates




































































dTm2 − dT 2|s1
)]
(26)
where dT 2|s1 =
∑M
k=1 Pk2|s1dTk2 is the average of all net-of-tax rate changes weighted by
the choice probabilities of a household in the municipality of origin s.
A.2 Proof of Hypothesis 1
(a) (dTm2 − T 2|s1) > 0 for the lowest-tax municipality m = 1 as any weighted average
T 2|s1 with strictly positive weights Pk2|s1 is smaller than the change in the net-of-tax rate
dTm2 of the lowest-tax municipality. The weighted sum over all municipalities of origins
is also positive as Ps1 > 0 and Pm2|s1 > 0. Hence, dP12 > 0 as β > 0. (b) Analogously. 
A.3 Generalization of Hypothesis 1











The effect of the simultaneous change of all net-of-tax rates, Tk2 = log(1 − τk2), is the






























































dTm2 is the weighted average over all net-of-tax rate
changes in group g, PGg2|s1 is the probability of choosing a destination municipality in
group g, and dT 2|s1 =
∑M
m=1 Pm2|s1dTm2 as in Eq.(26).
Hypothesis A.1 (Effect on choosing a group of municipalities).
The effect of a simultaneous change of all tax rates on the probability of choosing a group
of municipalities is
a) strictly positive for the lowest-tax group of municipalities, i.e.
dPG12 > 0,
b) and strictly negative for the highest-tax group of municipalities, i.e.
dPGG2 < 0.







m=1 Pm2|s1dTm2 > 0 for the
lowest-tax group of municipalities g = 1 as the average dTGg of all changes in the lowest-
tax group is strictly bigger than the average of all changes dT 2|s1 because both averages
are weighted by the same relative weights Pm2|s1. The weighted sum over all municipalities
of origin m is also positive as Ps1 > 0 and PGg2|s1 > 0. Hence, dPG12 > 0 as β > 0. (b)
Analogously. 
A.4 Derivation of Eq. (12)
The probability of moving out of municipality m strictly decreases with the net-of-tax






= −βPm2|m1 · (1− Pm2|m1) < 0 (29)
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and increases with the net-of-tax rate of any other municipality s 6= m
∂Pmove|m1
∂Ts2
= βPm2|m1Ps2|m1 > 0. (30)
The effect of the simultaneous change of all tax rates τm2, and hence all net-of-tax



































dTm2 − dT 2|m1
)
= −βPm2|m1(1− Pm2|m1[1− e−c])(dTm2 − dT 2) (31)
where dT 2|m1 =
∑M
s=1 Ps2|m1dTs2 is the average of the net-of-tax changes weighted by the





is the average weighted by the choice probabilities in the absence of moving costs. Note
that (1 − Pm2|m1[1 − e−c]) ∈ (0, 1] equals one in the absence of moving costs, c = 0, and
zero for infinite moving costs c→∞.
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The last step in Eq. (12) was derived as

















































































































= (1− Pm2|m1[1− e−c])(dTm2 − dT 2).
A.5 Proof of Hypothesis 2
(a) dPmove|m1 = −βPm2|m1(1−Pm2|m1[1− e−c])(dTm2− dT 2) < 0 if dTm2 > dT 2 (low-tax)
as Pm2|m1 ∈ [0, 1] and (1− Pm2|m1[1− e−c]) ∈ (0, 1]. (b) Analogously. 
A.6 Generalization of Hypothesis 2








The effect of the simultaneous change of all tax rates τm2 and hence all net-of-tax rates























Pm2|m1(1− Pm2|m1[1− e−c])(dTm2 − dT 2)
]
where Pm1 is the probability of choosing municipality m in period 1 and PGg1 is the
probability of choosing any municipality of group g in period 1.
Hypothesis A.2 (Effect on moving, group version).
The effect of a simultaneous change of all tax rates on the probability of moving, condi-
tional on staying in any municipality of a particular group of municipalities is
a) strictly negative for groups where all municipalities have net-of-tax rates above av-
erage (low-tax), i.e.
dPmove|Gg1 < 0 if dTm2 > dT 2 for all m ∈ Gg,
b) strictly positive for groups where all municipalities have net-of-tax rates below aver-
age (high tax), i.e.
dPmove|Gg1 > 0 if dTm2 < dT 2 for all m ∈ Gg.
Proof: (a) dPmove|Gg1 is a weighted average over dPmove|m1. From Hypothesis 2,
dPmove|m1 < 0 if dTm2 > dT 2 . Hence dPmove|Gg1 < 0 as dTm2 > dT 2 for all m ∈ Gg. (b)
Analogously. 
A.7 Derivation of the migration elasticity
The elasticity of the unconditional probability Pm2 of choosing a municipality m w.r.t.





































































(Pm2 − Pm2|m1 Pm1)
∑
s 6=m
Pm2|s1 (1− Pm2|s1)Ps1 (35)
















= −β Pm2|m1. (36)
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B Appendix: Empirical strategy
B.1 Structural estimation with groups of municipalities
To obtain an explicit structural expression for estimation, we solve Eq. (28) for β. This





[“Ps1“PGg2|s1 (d̂TGg2|s1 − d̂T 2|s1)] . (37)
Here, d̂PGg2 is the discontinuity estimate from the fuzzy regression discontinuity de-
sign, “Ps1 is the share of households in municipality s, “PGg2|s1 = ∑m∈Gg “Pm2|s1, d̂T 2|s1 =∑M
m=1
“Pm2|s1d̂Tm2, and d̂TGg2|s1 = ∑m∈Gg P̂m2|s1P̂Gg2|s1 d̂Tm2. The net-of-tax rate change d̂Tm2
is the average over the individual net-of-tax rate changes dTim of all households residing
in municipality m in period 1.







“Pm2|m1(d̂Tm2 − d̂T 2|m1)]
where d̂T 2|s1 =
∑M
m=1
“Pm2|s1dTm2 and d̂Pmove|Gg1 is again the discontinuity estimate from
the corresponding fuzzy RDD.












We estimate the migration elasticity as
η̂m = β̂
1“Pm2 M∑s=1 [“Pm2|s1(1− “Pm2|s1)“Ps1] . (38)
The migration elasticity varies by municipality m. We summarize these municipality-
specific parameters by reporting the average elasticity over all municipalities weighted by








[“Pm2|s1(1− “Pm2|s1)“Ps1] . (39)
B.2 Structural estimation with spatial pooling
The theoretical model outlined above describes the choice of a group of municipalities
within a canton where the control group faces identical tax rates across all municipalities.
As discussed in Section 4.4, we pool the location choices over all cantons considering all
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municipalities of a canton as the choice set for the household. Therefore, we model the
observed treatment effect on location choice or mobility in the pooled data as the average
effect over all cantons k, weighted by the population share Pk1 of canton k in period 1.


















“Pm2|m1(d̂Tm2 − d̂T 2|m1)] , (41)
where all population shares are within cantons such that
∑Mk
m=1
“Pm2|s1 = 1 and∑Mkm=1 “Pm2 =
1. Mk is the number of municipalities in canton k. The migration elasticity is then also
based on the Mk municipalities of the respective canton k:
η̂m = β̂
1“Pm2 Mk∑s=1 [“Pm2|s1(1− “Pm2|s1)“Ps1] . (42)














[“Pm2|s1(1− “Pm2|s1)“Ps1] , (43)
where “Pm2 is the population share of municipality m within the respective canton, “Pk2 is
the population share of canton k within Switzerland and “Pk2“Pm2 is the population share
of municipality m within Switzerland.
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C Appendix: Additional tables and figures
Table C.1: Descriptive Statistics for Experimental Sample
Variable Mean St. Dev. Median Min Max Obs
Individual characteristics
Gross income in 1000 61.975 26.683 63.700 0.000 114.000 19,313
Duration in 100 28.804 19.838 22.240 3.650 73.000 19,313
Permit C 0.497 0 1 19,313
Age 36.500 8.756 36 18 78 19,313
Type of residential municipality and moving
Low-tax 0.515 0 1 19,313
Very low-tax 0.267 0 1 19,313
Medium low-tax 0.249 0 1 19,313
Medium high-tax 0.230 0 1 19,313
Very high-tax 0.255 0 1 19,313
High-tax 0.485 0 1 19,313
Move 0.061 0 1 19,313
Difference between ordinary and special income tax rate in %, all incomes (0 – 114k)
All observations −0.065 0.575 0.000 −4.332 2.424 19,313
Obs. in low-tax municipalities −0.461 0.496 −0.328 −4.332 0.000 9,954
Obs. in high-tax municipalities 0.356 0.276 0.309 0.000 2.424 9,359
Difference between ordinary and special income tax rate in %, high incomes (60k – 114k)
All observations −0.089 0.687 0.038 −4.332 2.406 10,716
Obs. in low-tax municipalities −0.635 0.549 −0.495 −4.332 0.000 5,208
Obs. in very low-tax municipalities −0.924 0.563 −0.760 −4.332 0.000 2,950
Obs. in medium low-tax municipal. −0.258 0.177 −0.238 −1.078 0.000 2,258
Obs. in medium high-tax municipal. 0.288 0.192 0.264 0.000 1.512 2,508
Obs. in very high-tax municipalities 0.545 0.303 0.449 0.168 2.406 3,000
Obs. in high-tax municipalities 0.428 0.288 0.370 0.000 2.406 5,508
Notes: Summary statistics for the main variables in the experimental sample for observations with
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Figure C.1: Individuals’ characteristics around the threshold of 5 years of stay. These graphs
show local linear smooths of the covariate values of individuals around the threshold, using the
whole sample and a bandwidth of 1460 days. The light gray dashed lines indicate the 90%
pointwise confidence bands and the gray dots raw weighted averages of the dependent variable
in half yearly bins. The corresponding discontinuity estimates can be found in Table C.5
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Table C.2: Probability of holding permit C
Full sample Low-tax High-tax Very high-tax
municipalities municipalities municipalities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Effect ∆P 0.223*** 0.274*** 0.247*** 0.279*** 0.179*** 0.231*** 0.169*** 0.234***
(0.023) (0.015) (0.035) (0.023) (0.036) (0.023) (0.049) (0.032)
Bandwidth 730 1460 730 1460 730 1460 730 1460
N left 4787 9760 1978 4061 1913 3927 1048 2146
N right 3426 5543 1338 2215 1390 2253 746 1188
Medium high-tax Medium low-tax Very low-tax
municipalities municipalities municipalities
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Effect ∆P 0.191*** 0.228*** 0.255*** 0.319*** 0.245*** 0.248***
(0.053) (0.034) (0.052) (0.033) (0.048) (0.032)
Bandwidth 730 1460 730 1460 730 1460
N left 865 1781 949 1953 1029 2108
N right 644 1065 627 1061 711 1154
Low-income High-income Placebo
group group sample
(15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
Effect ∆P 0.169*** 0.218*** 0.239*** 0.279*** 0.309*** 0.389***
(0.040) (0.026) (0.032) (0.021) (0.066) (0.044)
Bandwidth 730 1460 730 1460 730 1460
N left 1496 3217 2395 4771 553 1062
N right 1041 1775 1687 2693 439 667
Notes: Local linear SRD estimates of the discontinuity in the probability of treatment, i.e. holding permit
C, for different municipality types, income groups, and bandwidths. Estimates account for sampling
weights. Standard errors in parentheses. Sample specification: ‘Full sample’ is based on the whole
defined sample, ‘Placebo’ is based on the placebo sample, and the remaining estimates are based on the
respective groups within the experimental sample. Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05,
*** p < .01.
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Table C.3: Probability of moving away from a particular high-tax municipality for households
with and without children
Probability of moving from a high-tax municipality
Low − income High− income P lacebo− income
non- non- non-
parametric parametric parametric parametric parametric parametric
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(a) Child in Household
Effect ∆P -0.057 -0.028 0.235* 0.221** -0.007 0.02
(0.138) (0.100) (0.135) (0.108) (0.134) (0.102)
N left 453 453 449 449 147 147
N right 409 409 401 401 85 85
(b) No-Child in Household
Effect ∆P 0.503 0.322* 0.420*** 0.294** -0.023 -0.008
(0.380) (0.195) (0.140) (0.141) (0.118) (0.075)
N left 1033 1033 1992 1992 326 326
N right 422 422 1021 1021 231 231
Notes: Fuzzy RDD estimates of the probability of moving given the individual was residing in a high-tax
municipality for different income groups, separately for households with and without children. Nonpara-
metric means fuzzy RDD with local-linear regression using a triangular kernel, while parametric means
a linear instrumental variable estimation. All estimates include a bandwidth of 1460 days (4years) and
account for sampling weights. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1,
** .01 < p < .05, *** p < .01.
Table C.4: Implied Migration Elasticity
Based on estimated effect Based on estimated effect
on very high tax municipalities on very low tax municipalities
Point 95%-Confidence Point 95%-Confidence
Estimate Interval Estimate Interval
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(a) Elasticity estimates based on effects on residential choices (Table 2)
Effect ∆P -0.159 [ -0.323, -0.013 ] 0.065 [ -0.076, 0.207 ]
Parameter β 208.8 [ 18.39, 484.27 ] 80.39 [ -107.9, 297.0 ]
Elasticity η 22.34 [ 1.98, 45.86 ] 8.597 [ -10.22, 27.74 ]
(b) Elasticity estimates based on effects on mobility decisions (Table 4)
Effect ∆P 0.356 [ 0.090, 0.786 ] 0.023 [ -0.128, 0.177 ]
Parameter β 251.4 [ 77.81, 702.1 ] -19.66 [ -182.8, 130.3 ]
Elasticity η 26.89 [ 7.173, 65.89 ] -2.103 [-17.48 , 12.26 ]
Notes: Estimates of the average migration elasticity with respect to the net-of-tax rate based on the
parametric fuzzy RDD estimates on residential choices (Table 2) and mobility decisions (Table 4) for
the high income experimental sample. Confidence bounds are determined by a non-parametric bootstrap
with 2000 replications and the percentile method.
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Table C.5: Covariate balance around the threshold
Age (years) P(Female) HH size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Effect ∆ -0.480 -0.405 -0.287 -0.088** -0.036 -0.013 0.107 0.067 0.022
(0.712) (0.509) (0.367) (0.042) (0.030) (0.022) (0.099) (0.070) (0.050)
Mean dep. var. 36.35 36.35 36.35 0.41 0.41 0.41 2.13 2.13 2.13
Bandwidth 365 730 1460 365 730 1460 365 730 1460
N left 2210 4787 9760 2210 4787 9760 2210 4787 9760
N right 1930 3426 5543 1930 3426 5543 1930 3426 5543
P(High educ) P(perm. contract)
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Effect ∆ -0.048 -0.034 -0.011 -0.022 -0.026 -0.005
(0.043) (0.031) (0.022) (0.027) (0.020) (0.014)
Mean dep. var. 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.89 0.89 0.89
Bandwidth 365 730 1460 365 730 1460
N left 2210 4787 9760 2210 4787 9760
N right 1930 3426 5543 1930 3426 5543
Notes: Local linear SRD estimates of the discontinuity in individuals’ characteristics for the sample of
individuals around the duration threshold in the full sample. Estimates account for sampling weights.
Standard errors in parentheses. Mean dep. var. stands for the mean of the dependent variable for
individuals between 4 to 5 years of stay. Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** p < .01.
Table C.6: Probability of moving away from a particular municipality for four groups of
municipalities and several bandwidths: Low-income group
Probability of moving from a Probability of moving from a
very high-tax medium high-tax
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Effect ∆P 12.878 0.496 0.194 0.360 0.074 0.153 0.075 0.130
(440.361) (0.796) (0.199) (0.598) (0.635) (0.440) (0.233) (0.397)
Bandwidth 365 730 1460 842 365 730 1460 806
N left 155 353 758 422 151 341 728 388
N right 160 279 445 313 117 213 386 244
Probability of moving from a Probability of moving from a
medium low-tax very low-tax
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Effect ∆P 0.843 0.045 0.133 0.042 -0.322 -0.379 -0.036 -0.354
(1.270) (0.188) (0.115) (0.172) (0.359) (0.342) (0.271) (0.319)
Bandwidth 365 730 1460 846 365 730 1460 822
N left 204 441 944 520 155 361 787 409
N right 158 294 513 329 135 255 431 279
Notes: Local linear FRD estimates of the probability of moving conditional on the previous municipality
type for the low-income experiment sample and different bandwidths. Estimates account for sampling
weights. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** p < .01.
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Table C.7: Probability of moving away from a particular municipality for four groups of
municipalities and several bandwidths: High-income group
Probability moving from a Probability of moving from a
very high-tax medium high-tax
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Effect ∆P 1.261* 0.756*** 0.517*** 0.749*** 0.300 0.224 0.130 0.219
(0.736) (0.278) (0.145) (0.274) (0.297) (0.224) (0.138) (0.223)
Bandwidth 365 730 1460 738 365 730 1460 740
N left 333 695 1388 699 240 524 1053 529
N right 268 467 743 472 246 431 679 440
Probability moving from a Probability of moving from a
medium low-tax very low-tax
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Effect ∆P -0.102 -0.124 -0.090 -0.130 -0.252 -0.079 0.015 -0.079
(0.287) (0.170) (0.097) (0.156) (0.245) (0.148) (0.097) (0.148)
Bandwidth 365 730 1460 808 365 730 1460 724
N left 237 508 1009 562 313 668 1321 664
N right 175 333 548 368 277 456 723 454
Notes: Local linear FRD estimates of the probability of moving conditional on the previous municipality
type for the high-income experiment sample and different bandwidths. Estimates account for sampling
weights. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** p < .01.
Table C.8: Probability of moving away from a particular municipality for four groups of
municipalities and several bandwidths: Quasi-placebo group
Probability of moving from a Probability of moving from a
very high-tax medium high-tax
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Effect ∆P -0.100 0.015 0.053 -0.033 -0.110 -0.141 -0.079 -0.160
(0.319) (0.248) (0.147) (0.290) (0.259) (0.165) (0.106) (0.197)
Bandwidth 365 730 1460 522 365 730 1460 594
N left 89 189 303 134 37 83 170 68
N right 72 122 184 88 51 88 132 76
Probability of moving from a Probability of moving from a
medium low-tax very low-tax
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Effect ∆P -11.511 -0.189 -0.023 -13.656 0.084 0.0255 -0.000 0.068
(272.528) (0.57) (0.153) (377.917) (0.215) (0.179) (0.124) (0.208)
Bandwidth 365 730 1460 324 365 730 1460 535
N left 47 109 216 39 84 172 373 134
N right 43 81 139 38 76 148 212 106
Notes: Local linear FRD estimates of the probability of moving conditional on the previous municipality
type for the placebo sample and different bandwidths. Estimates account for sampling weights. Standard
errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** p < .01.
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Table C.9: Probability of moving away from a particular municipality for four groups of
municipalities and different income groups
1st order polynomial 2nd order polynomial
P (m|vh) P (m|mh) P (m|ml) P (m|vl) P (m|vh) P (m|mh) P (m|ml) P (m|vh)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(a) Low-income
Effect ∆P 0.074 0.071 0.195** 0.218 –0.088 0.125 0.052 –0.482*
(0.075) (0.194) (0.086) (0.163) (0.286) (0.601) (0.182) (0.281)
No. obs. 1196 1111 1450 1213 1196 1111 1450 1213
No. of clusters 23 22 23 23 23 22 23 23
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(b) High-income
Effect ∆P 0.171*** 0.156* –0.010 0.030 0.312** 0.079 –0.198 –0.077
(0.063) (0.092) (0.036) (0.072) (0.153) (0.229) (0.176) (0.118)
No. obs. 2123 1727 1554 2037 2123 1727 1554 2037
No. of clusters 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(c) Placebo-income
Effect ∆P 0.040 –0.032 0.019 –0.005 0.097 –0.294* 0.122 –0.022
(0.063) (0.055) (0.095) (0.059) (0.069) (0.171) (0.177) (0.137)
No. obs. 487 302 354 583 487 302 354 583
No. of clusters 17 20 20 21 17 20 20 21
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard parametric FRD (IV) estimates using a linear probability model for foreigners whose
duration of stay in Switzerland was between 1 and 8 years. The estimates are reported for all four
municipality types, the low and high income group, as well as for the quasi-placebo group with an income
of above 126,000 Swiss francs. Estimates account for sampling weights and the standard errors are
clustered at the cantonal level. The controls encompass: age, age squared, sex, an indicator for a child in
the household, the household size, income, civil status, education, occupation, and cantonal fixed effects.
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** p < .01.
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Table C.10: Probability of moving away from a particular municipality for four groups of
municipalities at a placebo threshold of 4 years’ stay
Probability of moving from a Probability of moving from a
very high-tax medium high-tax
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Effect ∆P -1.328 0.416 -0.035 0.382 0.867 0.611 0.342 0.686
(3.853) (0.427) (0.326) (0.409) (0.928) (0.492) (0.416) (0.541)
Bandwidth 365 730 1460 751 365 730 1460 672
N left 361 765 1054 787 284 587 813 543
N right 334 602 962 612 240 486 819 451
Probability of moving from a Probability of moving from a
medium low-tax very low-tax
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Effect ∆P 0.309 -1.1630 -0.866 -0.865 -0.888 0.077 0.312 0.084
(0.853) (2.144) (1.185) (1.338) (1.501) (0.688) (0.440) (0.670)
Bandwidth 365 730 1460 808 365 730 1460 737
N left 271 552 772 616 355 724 1008 731
N right 237 412 695 446 313 590 926 597
Notes: Local linear FRD estimates at the placebo threshold of four years of the probability of moving
conditional on the previous municipality type for the high-income experimental sample and different
bandwidths. Estimates account for sampling weights. Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** p < .01.
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Figure C.2: Income distribution for foreigners not holding the permanent residence permit
with a duration of stay below 5 years. Local likelihood density estimates using bandwidth = 5k
and taking the sampling weights into account, based on the local likelihood implementation
(locfit) in the Chronux software package for Matlab (Bokil et al., 2010). The corresponding
density discontinuity estimates can be found in row (a) of Table C.17.
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Table C.11: Probability of moving away from a particular municipality for four groups of
municipalities at a placebo threshold of 6 years’ stay
Probability of moving from a Probability of moving from a
very high-tax medium high-tax
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Effect ∆P 0.272 -0.520 -0.103 -0.524 0.410 0.987 0.213 1.215
(0.894) (1.852) (0.167) (1.007) (1.036) (2.585) (0.210) (3.806)
Bandwidth 365 730 1460 900 365 730 1460 670
N left 267 601 1367 779 244 486 1073 445
N right 199 360 571 425 185 333 512 319
Probability of moving from a Probability of moving from a
medium low-tax very low-tax
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Effect ∆P -4.744 0.010 -0.120 0.008 -0.309 0.872 0.035 0.986
(196.059) (0.800) (0.215) (0.755) (0.992) (5.715) (0.215) (7.428)
Bandwidth 365 730 1460 719 365 730 1460 742
N left 175 412 964 401 277 590 1314 598
N right 158 283 443 281 179 336 546 345
Notes: Local linear FRD estimates at the placebo threshold of six years of the probability of moving
conditional on the previous municipality type for the high-income experimental sample and different
bandwidths. Estimates account for sampling weights. Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** p < .01.
Table C.12: Probability of residing in a particular municipality type at a placebo threshold of
4 years’ stay
Probability of residing in Probability of residing in
a very high-tax a very low-tax
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Effect ∆P -2.539 -0.05 0.157 4.558 4.780 -0.742 -0.658 -1.16
(3.916) (0.503) (0.376) (17.516) (6.005) (0.544) (0.406) (0.844)
Bandwidth 365 730 1460 465 365 730 1460 625
N left 1271 2628 3647 1627 1271 2628 3647 2201
N right 1124 2090 3402 1425 1124 2090 3402 1842
Notes: Local linear FRD estimates at the placebo threshold of four years of the probability that an
individual is residing in the respective municipality type for the high-income experimental sample and
different bandwidths. Estimates account for sampling weights. Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** p < .01.
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Table C.13: Probability of residing in a particular municipality type at a placebo threshold of
6 years’ stay
Probability of residing in Probability of residing in
a very high-tax a very low-tax
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Effect ∆P -0.539 1.182 0.110 0.662 0.0514 -3.010 -0.287 -4.649
(0.895) (6.003) (0.181) (1.613) (0.795) (12.08) (0.185) (33.713)
Bandwidth 365 730 1460 836 365 730 1460 657
N left 963 2089 4718 2451 963 2089 4718 1847
N right 721 1312 2072 1487 721 1312 2072 1212
Notes: Local linear FRD estimates at the placebo threshold of six years of the probability that an indi-
vidual resides in the respective municipality type for the high-income experimental sample and different
bandwidths. Estimates account for sampling weights. Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** p < .01.
Table C.14: Density discontinuity estimates for the duration of stay
c h in 100 f̂l f̂r θ̂ l̂ f̂r/f̂l p-value N
(a) 18.25 1.80 0.015 0.017 0.002 0.727 1.102 0.394 33,109
(b) 18.25 3.65 0.016 0.016 −0.000 0.003 0.995 0.955 33,109
(c) 18.25 7.30 0.016 0.015 −0.001 0.520 0.957 0.471 33,109
(d) 18.25 4.96 0.016 0.016 −0.000 0.001 0.998 0.979 33,109
Notes: Local likelihood ratio results for the discontinuity in the distribution of the duration of stay, for
several bandwidths. θ̂ stands for the discontinuity estimate (θ̂ = f̂r − f̂l), l̂r is the value of the empirical
likelihood ratio, f̂r/f̂l is the relative size of the discontinuity, and N stands for the number of observations
with regard to the observations available to estimate the whole density in the sample.
The estimates for the discontinuity in the density are based on the approach in Otsu et al. (2013) which
was adjusted for the sampling weights in our data. We multiply the kernel weights by the sampling
weights in the summation part of the FOC.
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Table C.15: Determinants of the probability of residing in a low-tax municipality
Duration ≤ 2 years Duration ≥ 8 years
Probability of residing in Probability of residing in
low-tax very low-tax low-tax very low-tax
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Demographic:
Age 0.001 (0.002) 0.003 (0.002) * 0.000 (0.002) 0.002 (0.001)
Married 0.066 (0.037) * –0.027 (0.034) 0.038 (0.036) 0.013 (0.029)
Female 0.068 (0.032) ** 0.027 (0.029) –0.063 (0.031) ** –0.037 (0.029)
Child 0.012 (0.044) 0.070 (0.042) * –0.000 (0.035) 0.016 (0.030)
Income:
1000 CHF 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
Highest educational attainment:
High educ. –0.024 (0.039) –0.014 (0.037) –0.052 (0.040) –0.062 (0.035) *
Medium (ref.)
Low educ. 0.005 (0.056) –0.001 (0.051) –0.063 (0.037) * –0.050 (0.030) *
In educ. 0.083 (0.148) –0.066 (0.161) –0.157 (0.085) * –0.118 (0.071) *
Educ NA –0.106 (0.234) 0.147 (0.213) 0.086 (0.184) –0.044 (0.174)
Work contract:
Perm. contract 0.057 (0.044) 0.038 (0.037) 0.011 (0.054) –0.039 (0.047)
Current occupation:
Craftsmen (ref.)
Manager 0.050 (0.069) 0.057 (0.066) 0.138 (0.066) ** 0.130 (0.060) **
Academic profession 0.015 (0.055) 0.037 (0.050) 0.088 (0.059) 0.093 (0.053) *
Engeneers/Technician –0.016 (0.055) 0.025 (0.050) 0.130 (0.051) ** 0.109 (0.049) **
Service/Salesman 0.025 (0.065) 0.081 (0.063) 0.126 (0.046) *** 0.076 (0.037) **
Forestry 0.244 (0.186) 0.019 (0.188) 0.387 (0.119) *** 0.331 (0.137) **
Machine operator –0.025 (0.085) 0.035 (0.083) 0.055 (0.054) 0.014 (0.044)
Elementary occupation –0.077 (0.108) –0.080 (0.082) 0.157 (0.071) ** 0.023 (0.042)
Occupation NA –0.167 (0.101) * –0.058 (0.080) 0.033 (0.154) 0.019 (0.133)
Industry sector:
Construction (ref.)
Land & Forestry 0.195 (0.213) –0.110 (0.185) –0.073 (0.151) –0.074 (0.154)
Industry 0.106 (0.087) 0.016 (0.080) 0.034 (0.082) 0.158 (0.063) **
Energy/Water supply –0.202 (0.314) –0.104 (0.306) 0.414 (0.076) *** 0.459 (0.224) **
Trade 0.068 (0.096) –0.041 (0.088) 0.098 (0.086) 0.188 (0.072) ***
Catering industry –0.027 (0.113) –0.056 (0.100) –0.160 (0.086) * –0.045 (0.056)
Traffic/News 0.039 (0.120) –0.125 (0.094) –0.090 (0.119) 0.014 (0.104)
Financial services –0.080 (0.112) –0.070 (0.098) 0.112 (0.143) 0.333 (0.137) **
Real estate/Informatics 0.090 (0.093) 0.069 (0.085) –0.014 (0.102) 0.067 (0.070)
Public services 0.258 (0.156) * 0.097 (0.178) –0.018 (0.153) 0.014 (0.148)
Education 0.023 (0.098) –0.061 (0.086) –0.148 (0.105) –0.032 (0.067)
Health & social services 0.070 (0.092) 0.042 (0.087) –0.124 (0.084) 0.010 (0.061)
Other services 0.123 (0.116) –0.144 (0.091) 0.030 (0.124) 0.067 (0.080)
Private households 0.087 (0.187) –0.029 (0.148) 0.072 (0.165) 0.323 (0.139) **
Other/ Sector NA –0.076 (0.207) 0.121 (0.177) –0.207 (0.137) –0.066 (0.104)
FE year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1669 1669 2234 2234
R2 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.06
Adj. R2 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04
Notes: Correlation between individual characteristics and the probability that an individual resides
in a low-tax or a very low-tax municipality. Sample specification: Specifications (1) and (2) use the
experimental sample of individuals with an income above 10,000 and below 114,000 Swiss francs and not
holding the permanent residence permit in their first 2 years of stay in the country. Specifications (3)
and (4) use the sample of individuals in the experimental sample having an income of above 10,000 and
below 114,000 Swiss francs but already holding the permanent residence permit in their 8 to 12 years of
stay in the country. Estimates account for sampling weights, standard errors are reported in brackets to
the right of the point estimates. Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** p < .01.
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Table C.16: Probability of residing in a low-tax or very-low tax municipality
Basic sample Excluding manipulation range (±6k)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(a) Probability of residing in a low-tax municipality
Effect ∆P 0.221 0.298** 0.263** 0.148** -0.081 -0.125 -0.083 -0.090
(0.207) (0.145) (0.102) (0.067) (0.199) (0.142) (0.100) (0.069)
Bandwidth 2.5k 5k 10k 21.918k 2.5k 5k 10k 20.132k
N left 80 180 407 1111 109 225 488 1181
N right 93 186 335 669 74 151 297 555
(b) Probability of residing in a very low-tax municipality
Effect ∆P 0.195 0.257* 0.186* 0.041 -0.207 -0.122 -0.136 -0.136*
(0.204) (0.141) (0.097) (0.067) (0.174) (0.127) (0.092) (0.073)
Bandwidth 2.5k 5k 10k 19.840k 2.5k 5k 10k 15.600k
N left 80 180 407 963 109 225 488 836
N right 93 186 335 628 74 151 297 462
Notes: Local linear sharp RDD estimates for the probability that an individual resides in a low or a very
low-tax municipality at the income threshold of 120,000 Swiss francs for the sample of foreigners not
holding the permanent residence status (permit C) during their first five years in Switzerland. Estimates
account for sampling weights. Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** p < .01.
Table C.17: Density discontinuity estimates for income
c h f̂l f̂r θ̂ l̂r f̂r/f̂l p-value N
High-tax municipalities
(a) 120k 5k 0.003 0.003 −0.000 0.054 0.905 0.816 4,562
(b) 120k 6k 0.003 0.003 −0.001 0.185 0.824 0.667 4,562
(c) 120k 7k 0.004 0.003 −0.001 0.365 0.759 0.546 4,562
(d) 120k 24.62k 0.004 0.003 −0.001 0.587 0.819 0.444 4,562
Low-tax municipalities
(a) 120k 5k 0.002 0.005 0.003 9.029 2.760 0.003 4,827
(b) 120k 6k 0.002 0.005 0.003 9.080 2.463 0.003 4,827
(c) 120k 7k 0.002 0.005 0.003 9.290 2.302 0.002 4,827
(d) 120k 26.04k 0.003 0.004 0.001 2.505 1.291 0.114 4,827
Notes: Local likelihood ratio results for the discontinuity in the income distribution of foreigners not
holding the permanent residence permit with a duration of stay below 5 years at the 120k income threshold
for several bandwidths. θ̂ stands for the discontinuity estimate (θ̂ = f̂r−f̂l), l̂r is the value of the empirical
likelihood ratio, f̂r/f̂l is the relative size of the discontinuity, and N stands for the number of observations
with regard to the observations available to estimate the whole density in the sample.
The estimates for the discontinuity in the density are based on the approach in Otsu et al. (2013), which
was adjusted for the sampling weights in our data. We multiply the kernel weights by the sampling
weights in the summation part of the FOC.
62
